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Introduction
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was signed on April 10, 1972.  The
United States, the USSR, and United Kingdom deposited their instruments of Ratification
of the Convention on March 26, 1975, and the Treaty came into force.  It was the first—and
for a long time only—post-World War II disarmament treaty in which an entire class of
weapons of mass destruction was done away with—or so it was widely assumed at the
time—and the arms control community by and large thought biological warfare had been
removed from the scene.  Contrary to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 (NPT),
there was to be no preferred group of countries that would continue to retain the weapons.
 Biological weapons were to be prohibited to all, into the future.  This was the first major and
unique distinction of the subject.
The second was that one of the two superpowers—the United States—that did
possess biological weapons, gave them up and destroyed them, even before the Treaty came
into being:
“Biological weapons provide a case in which the usual approach to arms
limitation was reversed.  Instead of first negotiating a treaty and then
implementing its provisions, an entire class of weapons was renounced by a
major possessor without any prior international agreement.  This was in
November 1969, when President Nixon, after extensive review, declared that
the United States would unconditionally renounce the deployment,
procurement, and stockpiling of biological weapons, would destroy all stocks
of agents and weapons, and would convert facilities for their development
and production to peaceful purposes.  In announcing these decisions, he also
declared support for the principles and objectives of a draft convention
prohibiting biological weapons that had been proposed by Great Britain. 
Three months later, the United States unconditionally renounced toxin
weapons.”1
                                                
1 Matthew Meselson et al., “Verification of Biological and Toxin Weapons Disarmament,” Chapter 9 in
Verification:  Monitoring Disarmament, Francesco Caloger (ed.), Westview Press, Boulder, 1990, pp. 149-164.
The United States chose this policy at the time to dissociate biological from chemical
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weapons, the combined and historical framework under which arms control deliberations on
them had been carried on for many years in Geneva.  Article 9 of the BWC was an
undertaking to continue negotiations to achieve a chemical weapons disarmament treaty—but
an additional 22 years would pass before that would be achieved.  The BWC additionally
carried no verification provisions;  on-site verification was not something that the USSR
would consider or accept before the Stockholm Conference in 1986 and the Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987.  Nonetheless, the BWC does address
the question of non-compliance.
There was, however, a third major and unique distinction of the BWC:  in 1992
Russia admitted that the former USSR had been in gross, generic violation of the Treaty, the
only instance in which one of the superpowers admitted to having been in total violation of
a post-World War II arms control treaty.  By the end of the 1980s, it had also become clear
that a half dozen or more countries had decided to develop biological weapons in the
intervening years.  Thus the assumed achievement of the 1970s had been, at least in part,
reversed.  Chemical weapons had been used in the war between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s,
and allied troops that fought Iraq in the Gulf War in 1991 ran a risk of being attacked by both
chemical and biological weapons.  From the mid-1980s on, there had also been movement
to strengthen the BWC and add some kind of verification provisions to it, particularly once
the Chemical Weapons Convention was signed in January 1993.  In 1994, it was also
reported that “U.S. military doctrine on nuclear weapons since 1993 has assumed the
possible use of nuclear weapons to deter or respond to a chemical or biological attack. . . ,”
although there is no official U.S. government statement to this effect.2 
All these things placed biological weapons once again on the active arms control
agenda.  This paper examines four areas of interest:
! What was learned in recent years regarding the BW program of the former USSR,
and now Russia, and its present status;
! Proliferation of BW:  reviews of the state of public knowledge regarding those 
countries known or strongly suspected of having BW programs;
                                                
2 “U.S. Nuke Response Is Included in Doctrine,” Defense News, November 14-20, 1994, and Theresa Hitchens,
“U.S. Must Spell Out BioWar Response,” Defense News, September 11-17, 1995.
In the case of chemical weapons, on May 13, 1991, President Bush announced that when the Chemical
Weapons Convention went into force, provided that the then-USSR was a participant, the United States would
not use CW under any circumstances, including  retaliation against a chemical attack.  This was reiterated by
the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in this case it was assumed that retaliation would be through
the massive use of conventional high-explosive munitions.
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! Developments in BW arms control since 1975, and particularly in the last six years;
! Some discussion of the problems of verification of BW arms control.
In the proliferation section, the disclosures since 1990-1991 and the Gulf War regarding
Iraq’s BW program are treated in the greatest detail.  The proliferation section also includes
a discussion of the potential use of biological weapons by extra-national or “terrorist” groups.
The Biological Weapons Program of the Former USSR and Russia
It was not the astonishing harvest of arms control treaties at the end of President
Gorbachev’s tenure—the INF, Strategic Arms Reductions Treaties (START), Conventional
Forces in Europe (CFE) agreements—and the USSR’s admission to having a chemical
weapons stockpile that brought about the exposure and admission of its BW program.  It was
not even the dissolution of the USSR.  It was essentially the result of a crucially positioned
defector from the USSR who reached Britain in 1989.  As a consequence, President Bush and
Prime Minister Thatcher both pressed the issue with President Gorbachev.  He denied that
the USSR had a BW program.  It took three years for the British and American governments
to obtain a Russian admission.  It came in a speech by Boris Yeltsin in January 1992, on the
eve of his visit to the United States to meet with President Bush, when he referred to “a lag
in implementing” the 1972 BWC.3  On January 19, 1993, the U.S. government released its
arms control treaty compliance report for the previous year.  It stated the following:
“The United States has determined that the Russian offensive biological
warfare program, inherited from the Soviet Union, violated the Biological
Weapons Convention through at least March 1992.  The Soviet offensive BW
program was massive, and included production, weaponization, and
stockpiling.  The status of the program since that time remains unclear.”4
                                                
3 Details of the history of events dealing with the USSR’s and then Russian BW program between 1989 and
1994, as well as a more detailed treatment of U.S. allegations regarding that program from 1975 on, appeared
in a series of four papers: Milton Leitenberg, “A Return to Sverdlovsk:  Allegations of Soviet Activities Related
to Biological Weapons,” Arms  Control, 12:2, September 1991, pp. 161-190; Milton Leitenberg, “Anthrax in
Sverdlovsk: New Pieces to the Puzzle,” Arms Control Today, 22:3, April 1992, pp. 10- 13;  Milton Leitenberg,
“The Biological Weapons Program of the Former Soviet Union,” Biologicals, 21:3, September 1993,  pp. 187-
191;  Milton Leitenberg, “The Conversion of Biological Warfare Research and Development Facilities to
Peaceful Uses,”    Chapter 8 in Control of Dual-Threat Agents:  The Vaccines for Peace Programme, E.
Geissler and J.P. Woodall (eds.),  SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 77-105.
4 “Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Treaties,” January 19, 1993; pp. 14-15, “The 1972
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The United States had noted the USSR’s non-compliance with the BWC in its annual reports
since 1984.
The program was halted—or at least in part circumscribed—only after extensive
pressure by the U.S. and British governments, and following U.S. Senate legislation which
forbade U.S. financial assistance to Russian strategic weapons destruction programs unless
the U.S. president could certify that the former USSR, and subsequently Russia, “was
committed to moving toward compliance with all arms control agreements.”  In April 1992
President Yeltsin announced a decree stating that “It shall be established that the
development and implementation of biological programmes in breach of the Convention. .
. is not being permitted in the territory of the Russian Federation.”5  In the decree, Yeltsin
also appointed a committee—headed by Major General Anatoly Kuntsevich, formerly deputy
head of the Soviet chemical forces—which was to report to him in a month about how to
achieve this.6  In the succeeding months, however, the British and U.S. governments
remained convinced that the Russian BW program continued activities that violated the
BWC.  And in September, 1992 they obtained Russian agreement to the establishment of a
“trilateral” process of information sharing and mutual site visits in an effort to increase the
                                                                                                                                                
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.”
In 1986, after Gorbachev’s accession to power in the USSR, the Soviet ambassador to the Second
Review Conference of the BWC, held in 1986, made the following statement to the conference:
 “In accordance with the legislation and practice of the Soviet Union, observance of the provisions of the
biological weapons convention, which was ratified by the decree of 11 February 1975 of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, is guaranteed by the relevant State institutions of the USSR.  The Soviet Union
does not possess any of the bacteriological (biological) agents or toxins, weapons, equipment or means of
delivery specified in Article I of the convention, nor does it conduct research or development work for the
purposes of producing or perfecting that kind of weapon.
 “. . . In the Soviet Union, research and development work with the use of microorganisms and toxins is
conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes, in the interests of health, the microbial industry, and agricultural
production.”  Michael E. Kokeiv, “The Reality of Disarmament,” Disarmament (United Nations) 10:1, Winter
1986-1987, pp. 66-72.
5 “Decree of the President of the Russian Federation on Fulfilling International Obligations with Regard to
Biological Weapons,” April 11, 1992, two pages.
6 In September 1992, General Kuntsevich stated the following in a Russian interview:  “Indeed these clear
violations on the convention were only admitted after the totalitarian regime collapsed and duplicity in politics
was abandoned. . . .The remnants of the offensive programs in the area of biological weapons were still around
as recently as 1991.  It was only in 1992 that Russia absolutely stopped this work. . .
“We did not have stockpiles of biological weapons.  The point is that they cannot be kept for a long time. 
Therefore, the question of their destruction does not come up. . .
“Within the Russian Defense Ministry’s structure the relevant directorate has been abolished and a directorate
for radiological, chemical, and biological protection has been set up.”  Interview with General Kuntsevich in
Rossiyskiye Vesti, September 22, 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-186, September 24, 1992.
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transparency of the Russian program and to bring an end to its illegitimate activities. 
The trilateral statement “confirmed the termination of offensive research, the
dismantlement of experimental technological lines for the production of agents, and the
closure of the biological weapons testing facility” in Russia.7  It also “dissolved the
department in the Ministry of Defense responsible for the offensive biological programme.
. . , cut the number of personnel involved in military biological programmes by 50 percent,
(and) reduced military biological research funding by 30 percent.”  That partial reduction was
demonstrably less of a curtailment than the zero budget allocation and the “halt (in) Russian
research into biological weapons” that President Yeltsin and his then military advisor,
General Volkogonov, had promised in February 1992.  Reciprocal visits that could take place
at any time with unrestricted access to each other’s non-military, but potentially BW-related
facilities, were to be negotiated.  They were not true “short notice” visits, but in essence,
challenge inspections with some caveats.  The first visits to a Soviet facility had actually
taken place in 1991.  There were other important provisions to the agreement as well, and
trilateral working groups were instituted so that a continuous process was initiated.  Russian
government visitors had actually been to the U.S. military facility, the United States Army
Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID, the lead agency of the U.S. Biological
Defensive Research Program) at Fort Detrick, Maryland, in mid-1992, just as the former
USSR dissolved, as well as to the site of a U.S. Department of Defense (DoD)-contracted
vaccine production facility.  These visits had in all likelihood been arranged as part of the
effort to get the former USSR to permit on-site inspection of Russian laboratories outside
nominal Soviet Ministry of Defense control that the United States was interested in opening
up.  (See discussion below on the organization of the Soviet BW program.)  Nevertheless,
for the next three years the USSR did not permit site visits to its military BW facilities, and
as of May 1996, it has still proved impossible to arrange for Western visits to them.
U.S. and British concerns continued, however.  In April 1994, U.S. officials stated
“We have evidence that leads us to understand that there is still an offensive biological
weapons program underway (in Russia). . . Yeltsin’s decrees have not filtered down to the
working levels.”8  There had been virtually no publicly available information in the 18
                                                
7 Joint Statement on Biological Weapons by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and
the Russian Federation, September 15, 1992, three pages.  See also, “Certification of Commitments of Russia:
 Justification,” United States Department of State, February 10, 1994, p. 8, in respect to the 1972 BWC.
8 R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Wary of Russian Germ Arms;  Despite Assurances from Yeltsin, Effort May Be
Continuing,” Washington Post, April 8, 1994.  See also, Thomas W. Lippman, “Administration Voices Concern
on Russian Treaty Compliance;  Congress Told Russian Chemical, Germ Weapons Plans Are Suspect,”
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months between September 1992 and April 1994 on what was taking place inside the
institutions that comprised the BW R&D program of the former USSR.  Once again, U.S.
and British qualms were substantially based on information from inside the Russian program,
delivered by two new defectors, one in the winter of 1992, and the last in the fall of 1993.
 In addition, the U.S. and British inspections in 1993 and 1994 “demonstrated that a
‘substantial infrastructure with no commercial purpose’ and with links to the Russian
military remains largely intact.”9
These issues had yet again been brought to the attention of Russian President Boris
Yeltsin—now by President Clinton during his visit to Moscow in January 1994, during U.S.
Secretary of Defense Perry’s visit to Moscow in March 1994, and at the September 1994
Yeltsin-Clinton summit meeting.  Also Russia had submitted its annual BWC data
declaration to the United Nations in April 1994, but it provided “no additions to Russia’s
1992 declaration of past offensive BW activities”—the “Form F” submission which was to
recount all past offensive programs going back to 1945—and U.S. officials had complained
that the 1992 Russian submission was even retrogressive in some respects compared to the
one that the USSR had submitted in 1988.   In part for reasons unrelated to BW issues,
General Kuntsevich was dismissed as director of the Russian Presidential Committee on the
Problems of Chemical and Biological Disarmament on April 7, 1994.  At the summit in May
1995, Russia agreed—in principle—to finally permit inspection visits to the BW facilities
directly managed by the Russian military.  The visits were to take place in August 1995;10
but as of May 1996, they had not yet occurred.  The unclassified version of a special U.S.
government report in October 1994 on Russian compliance with biological and chemical
arms control agreements stated that “The United States continues to have concerns about
Russia’s compliance with the BWC,”11 and as recent as April 1996, a U.S. Department of
Defense report repeated the following:
“The United States continues to have concerns about Russian compliance
                                                                                                                                                
Washington Post, December 11, 1994.
9 R. Jeffrey Smith, ibid.
10 R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. Aides Report Progress with Russia on Inspections;  No Summit Gains Cited on Other
Arms Related Disputes,” Washington Post, May 17, 1995.   See also, R. Jeffrey Smith, “U.S. to Press Moscow
on Alleged Arms Violations,” Washington Post, May 9, 1995.
11 Report on Demonstration of Russian Commitment to Comply with Three Agreements on Chemical and
Biological Weapons, undated, nine page.
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with the Biological Weapons Convention, despite President Yeltsin’s decree
in April 1992 banning all activities contravening the Convention.  Russia may
be retaining capability for the production of biological warfare agents.”12
 Given the history of these events since 1989—a period of over six years—it seems clear that
neither the Soviet nor the Russian senior military or political leadership was in any great
hurry to thoroughly do away with residual portions of the USSR’s offensive BW program.
 What were the parameters of that program?  In September 1992 Russian Deputy
Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov stated that the post-World War II Soviet BW program
had been in progress since 1946.13  For the most part, however, the Soviet institutes,
laboratories and administrative structure that were in violation of the BWC were established
after the 1972-1975 period, after the United States had dismantled most of its BW research
apparatus and had destroyed its production facility and BW stockpile, and after the BWC had
come into force.
As a result of agreements reached at the Third Review Conference of the BWC in
1986, the USSR agreed to an exchange of information dealing with certain categories of its
microbiological research institutions.  On  October 13, 1987, the USSR provided the first
such exchange of information which was subsequently to be deposited annually.  It reported
five laboratories under Ministry of Defense control:  (a) Leningrad (now St. Petersburg);  (b)
                                                
12 Proliferation: Threats and Response, U.S. Department of Defense, April 1996, p. 32.  The report added that
“Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have no known biological warfare programs and no intention of establishing
them.”
13 The original sources for the material in this section are for the most part in Leitenberg, 1994, op. cit. See also,
 Confidence-Building Measure F;  Russian Submission, 1992;  Raymond Zilinskas, “Biotechnology in the
USSR, Part I,” Biotechnology, July 2, 1984, pp. 610-615;  “Biotechnology in the USSR, Part II,”
Biotechnology,  August 2, 1994, pp. 686-692;  “The Weapon of Special Designation,” Chapter 20 in James
Adams, The New Spies:  Exploring the Frontiers of Espionage, Hutchinson, London, 1994, pp. 270-283; 337;
  Ogonyok;  No. 16, April 1995, pp. 36-37;  Anthony Rimington, Technology in Transition:  A Survey of
Biotechnology in Russia, Ukraine, and the Baltic States, Pinter Publishers, London, 1992.
A declassified U.S. National Intelligence Estimate of September 1954 (“Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1959,” NIE 11-4-54, p. 24) indicated no knowledge of specific
ongoing Soviet BW programs, and another in 1963 still indicated no knowledge of direct production:
“We believe that the Soviet Union has an active BW research effort which is suitable to support a complete BW
program, but there is insufficient evidence on which to base a firm assessment of Soviet BW offensive activities.
 However, the USSR has a comprehensive biological warfare defensive program which could lead to an
offensive capability.  The Soviets have concluded research on anti-personnel, anti-livestock, and possibly anti-
crop BW agents.  Although we have identified no mass production facility for BW agents and have no evidence
of Soviet stockpiling of such agents, research laboratories and existing plants for the production of vaccines
could provide these agents in quantity.”  “Soviet Military Capabilities and Policies, 1962-1967,” NIE 11-4-63,
pp. 56-57.
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Kirov;  (c) Sverdlovsk (now Ekaterinburg);  (d) Zagorsk (subsequently also referred to under
its pre-1917 name, Sergiyev-Posad), Moscow oblast;  and (e) Aralsk, Kzyl-Ordinsky oblast.
 There was also an open air BW testing ground on an island in the Aral Sea.  The Leningrad
site was under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of Defense Scientific Research Institute
for Military Medicine; the remaining four were under the USSR Ministry of Defense
Scientific Research Institute for Microbiology.
The 1989 Soviet submission and the disclosures of the Soviet defector Dr. Pasechnik
in the same year exposed another whole system of laboratories that were heavily involved
in the BW program, but were under the control of nominally civilian agencies.  These were
the All-Union Scientific Institute of Applied Microbiology at Obolensk, the Institute for
Ultrapure Drugs in Leningrad and the All-Union Research Institute for Molecular Biology
in Koltsovo. Also included were six other facilities that had been referred to on and off for
over a decade in leaks to the press by U.S. intelligence agencies, but also several that had not
been so identified, located in Moscow and in Chekhov.  A still classified 1992 U.S.
intelligence report referred to “16 known and suspected (Soviet) biological weapons
facilities,” up from nine previously “identified,” a number that was soon increased to 20. 
There were also indications that some BW R&D had been carried out in past years in a
system of plague research laboratories that the USSR had maintained throughout the country.
This second system of facilities belonged to an organization named Biopreparat,
which was under the jurisdiction of the USSR Ministry of the Medical and Microbiological
Industry.  Biopreparat had 25,000 employees and a budget of 100 million roubles per year
in the 1980s.  However, its facilities also produced a wide range of civilian products. And
there is no available information to indicate what proportion of its facilities or what
proportion of its staff were involved in prohibited BW R&D, although some of the facilities
were wholly devoted to BW work.14  There were 400 people working at the Leningrad
(Ultrapure) laboratory; 1,200 at Obolensk; at Kirov, 237 senior scientific personnel; at
                                                
14 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates late in 1994 still referred to 20 facilities with “6,500 to 25,000”
workers.  (“Russia Denies Biological Weapon Stockpiling,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 13, 1995.)  The
manner in which the personnel figure was estimated is not known, and it is so uncomfortably wide an estimate—
three fold—that it suggests that little is actually known about which facilities are actually doing what.
The names assigned to the Biopreparat organization have changed numerous times, in a manner not
atypical of certain Soviet organizations:  The All-Union Research and Production Association Biopreparat, The
Special Directorate of the Main Administration of the Microbiological Industry, the Main Directorate
Biopreparat of the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry, the State Concern Biopreparat.  “On 5 December
1991, it was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Health of Russia. . . .It is still run by a general.
 The facility is guarded, just as before, by warrant officers of the internal troops. . . .”
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Koltsovo over 3,000 personnel, but reportedly only about 10 percent of those were senior
scientists.  General Kuntsevich’s successor, General Valentin Yevstigneyev, (who had
headed the USSR/Russian BW defense program since 1985) claimed in September 1992 that
only “400 scientists in Russia are engaged in the research.”  That number seems quite low,
both for the number that may have been so engaged even in 1992, and most certainly in the
1980s.  In its 1993 BWC declaration, Russia listed five primary facilities, presumably the
five under Ministry of Defense control, and seven others, with a total staff of at least 6,000.
 Taking into account the apparent number of individual institutes involved and the total
number of employees in the program, the overall size of the Soviet BW R&D program
appears to have been an order of magnitude or more greater than that of the United States at
its peak in the late 1960s.
What is perhaps most interesting is what became known regarding the management
of the Biopreparat organization, which Deputy Foreign Minister Berdennikov called “one of
the best-guarded secrets in the old Soviet Union,” and one whose operations the Foreign
Ministry professed to know nothing about as late as the end of 1992.  Its management staff
was apparently taken from the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, one of the former
USSR’s eight defense industrial ministries, and the one responsible for producing nuclear
weapons.  It acted as an intermediary for funding and for the supply of resources to its
affiliated members and would therefore appear to have been a smaller and highly specialized
analogue to the USSR’s Military Industrial Commission (VPK).  The important particulars
are as follows:15
! It was established by Central Committee directive in 1973, and its first head was
General V.I. Ogarkov.
! “Technical and scientific documentation was transferred to [it] from the Ministry
of Defense.”  A directorate of the Defense Ministry, presumably the one that directed
the Ministry’s own biological warfare R&D institutes, was its “customer,” and it had
“strictly military tasks.”
! Its staff in 1991 was composed of 150 managers, operated “independently of the
structure to which it technically belonged,” and were “officers on loan, who had 
gained experience at the biological facilities of the Ministry of Defense.”
! It was responsible for the construction of the institutes in Obolensk and Koltsovo,
                                                
15 V. Umnov, “After 20 years of silence the Soviet microbes are talking,” Komsomol’skaya Pravda, April 30,
1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-087, May 5, 1992, pp. 4-6.  See also, S. Leskov, Izvestia,  June 26, 1993, in JPRS-
TND-93-025, August 2, 1993, pp. 13-17.
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but other enterprises as well (two in Vilnius are mentioned) that had nothing to do
with the biological warfare programme, and were allegedly a “cover.”  Also it 
acquired several operating plants.
! Biopreparat was referred to colloquially as “Ogarkov’s system,” after the name of
its first director.  The system contained 18 scientific institutes employing 25,000
workers—of whom 1,000 were scientists—five plants, and a large storage facility
in Siberia.  Several institutes and plants formerly subordinated to purely civilian
departments—such as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Health—also
worked for it.
! A “mobilization program and department” was organized within the Biopreparat
organization to begin production on short notice.  “The equipment was mothballed
in special shops (as a rule, operating biochemical production facilities were used).
 Such shops were idle at the Berdsk and Omutninsk Chemical Plants and the Progress
Plants in Stepnogorsk.  In addition, there was a plant within the organization of the
Ministry of Agriculture and two plants within the Ministry of Health.”  It is not 
stated, but the “short notice” production presumably would have been a BW agent
and not vaccine.  It is very likely that this “mobilization department . . . [and] . . . 
equipment” is the same “experimental technological lines for production of biological
agents” referred to in the U.S., British, and Russian statement of  September 15,1992.
 The “mobilization plan” allegedly specified the quantity and types of agents that were
to be produced on command.
! After Dr. Pasechnik’s defection in 1989, “the special equipment in the mothballed
shops. . . was shipped out,” some destroyed and some re-stored elsewhere.  
Allegedly, documentation was also destroyed.
! Also there were apparently other mechanisms of cooperation between the Ministry
of Health and Ministry of Defense.  Biopreparat, for example, acted as a channel for
funding from the Ministry of Health to some of its affiliated institutes.  Other 
indications of close relations between the two ministries were the roles played by 
senior generals—for example, General Y. I. Smirnov, as Minister of Health.  In 
1992, the head of Biopreparat was another former general of the Soviet Army’s 
Chemical Troops, Yuri Kalinin. 
! The second Biopreparat official who defected reported that offensive BW work had
continued within the Biopreparat system even after President Yeltsin’s decrees of 
February and April 1992 and the Russian legislation of August 1992, but that the 
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production plants had been mothballed.16
In summary, the Soviet military BW program was quite large with many facilities
spread across the breadth of the USSR, secret, directed by a branch of the General Staff, and
its funding was funneled through diverse ministries, including civilian ones.  The Defense
Ministry’s credibility was nil:  the General Staff’s Directorate for Bacteriological Radiation
and Chemical Defense claimed in 1992—following President Yeltsin’s admissions—that all
charges of an active Soviet (and then Russian) BW program were lies, and that “. . . all work
on biological weapons stopped in 1975.”17  The Directorate was renamed, but it retained its
existing staff, and its new head became the man who had headed the Soviet BW program
since 1985.  The directors of individual laboratories continued to profess the total innocence
of their respective institutions, and several strongly resisted the idea of, or need for,
conversion of their R&D programs to civil needs and programs.
Conversion of these sites should have been particularly easy.  Of all the kinds of
defense R&D installations, equipment, and personnel, those in the biological and medical
related sciences are the easiest to convert.18  In addition, the former Soviet Union—and then
Russia—was in dire need of every pharmaceutical product imaginable, and domestic vaccine
                                                
16 “Last autumn, another defector from the Biopreparat Project came over to British Intelligence to tell his
debriefers what steps the Russian military had taken to keep the project going.
“In every facility that had been opened for inspection to Western intelligence, the Russians had established
convincing cover stories that made it appear as if each site had been converted to research and manufacture of
vaccines.  The secret work continued in parts of the sites that were never visited by the American or British
officials.  At the same time, a secret new facility was being built at Lakhta near St. Petersburg.  Far from the
Biopreparat biological warfare programme being shut down, it had undergone considerable modernization. 
Work is continuing as before, in defiance of Yeltsin’s orders.” “At Face Value,” The Sunday Times, March 27,
1994.
17 As late as April 1994, portions of this establishment, with cooperation from sectors of the Russian
government—Radio Moscow being state controlled—were not above a little old-fashioned Soviet-style
disinformation.  Russian inspectors had visited the U.S. pharmaceutical firm, Pfizer, as part of the trilateral
exchange visits, and Radio Moscow reported that Pfizer was “producing biological weapons.”  Pfizer had also
“not only preserved but was modernizing the equipment designed earlier to produce biological warfare
formulas.”  Radio Moscow World Service, in English, April 12, 1994.  The same charges were also published
in Izvestiya on April 5, 1994.  The charges were thus mirror image inversions of those that the United States
and the UK were making to Russia in the trilateral consultations, regarding what U.S. and UK inspectors had
actually found at the Russian laboratories.  Soviet diplomatic officials continued to elaborate on this charge in
1995—that U.S. commercial pharmaceutical plants were providing a standby capacity to enable the U.S.
government to renew production of BW—and have claimed that it is the ostensible reason for stalling U.S. and
UK access to Russian military BW facilities.
18 The conversion of both the U.S. and former Soviet BW R&D facilities is discussed in detail in Leitenberg,
1994, op. cit.
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manufacture production standards had been neglected for decades.  The needs were obvious,
the relevant plants and trained personnel were all there, but matters dragged on for several
years.  Conversion programs were proposed, but little seemed to take place.  Funding offered
by Western nations for research through the International Science and Technology Center
 (ISTC) offices established in Russia and the Ukraine was delayed by lack of interest in the
Russian parliament and by bureaucratic intervention in the Ukraine.  It was not until March
1994 that the ISTC could offer funding to Russian and Ukrainian researchers, a delay of
some two years.19 
More recently, some efforts toward serious conversion have apparently taken place
at some of these sites.  At Koltsovo and Obolensk—both former Biopreparat facilities—
small private venture groups have been established by research staff members to utilize their
institute’s facilities for production and to market pharmaceuticals needed domestically in
Russia.  Also the U.S. Department of Defense has supplied Nunn-Lugar funds to a U.S. firm
entering a joint venture with a former Biopreparat facility at Stepnagorsk in Kazakhstan to
produce vitamins, and hoped thereby “. . . to eliminate biological weapons production
infrastructure” at the site.20  In addition to the U.S. Department of Defense, both the U.S.
Department of Energy and NASA are funding collaborative projects with laboratories inside
former Soviet BW institutions, and particularly, it appears, with those that were in the
Biopreparat system.21 
British, Japanese, South Korean, Finnish, Austrian, and other pharmaceutical firms
have also sought to arrange joint ventures with former Soviet “BW” laboratories.  However,
there is no overall quantitative estimate available as to how much of the plant or personnel
that was formerly occupied by the Soviet BW program has actually been converted as of the
spring of 1996.
                                                
19 “Trip Report on Symposium on Vaccine Production in Novosibirsk, Russia, December 12-14, 1994,”U.S.
Department of State, February 7, 1995.  (The laboratory in question is the Koltsovo institution.) See also, 
“Report on Bacterial Vaccine Symposium, State Research Center for Applied Microbiology, Obolensk, April
2-4, 1995,” U.S. Department of State, undated.
20 Bill Gertz, “Germ Warfare Gives Way to War on Germs,” Washington Times, April 6, 1995.
21 Anne M. Harrington, “Redirecting Biological Weapons Expertise:  Realities and Opportunities in the Former
Soviet Union,” Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Issues #29, September 1995, pp. 2-5.  Harrington’s
analysis is narrow and weak on the potential diversity of conversion possibilities, except for one reference to
bioremediation.  “Commercialization” is not the main point—the United States has the CDC and numerous
analogous national government laboratories working in other R&D areas that impact on social needs.  Neither
are “products exportable to the West.”  What is needed is production for and processes that can be applied in
the territory of the former USSR.
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There remain the final questions:  Why did the USSR mount a major effort in BW
precisely after the BWC came into force?  And why was it persistently retained even as the
USSR and its military leadership—the General Staff—entered into one major strategic arms
control treaty after the other:  INF and START, the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty dealing with conventional weapons, the acknowledgement of a chemical weapons
stockpile, the executive agreement with the United States to withdraw all deployed naval
tactical nuclear weapons, and even the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, and
finally, the USSR itself!  Surely each one of these was of far greater military significance
than the BW program?  Yet they were acceded to, while there obviously was a determined
effort to bluff, procrastinate, conceal, and draw out any disclosure of the BW program, to
hold on to it as long as possible, and to avoid putting a definitive end to it.
The first clue is provided by the following description of the policy debate in
Moscow at the time that the Biological Weapons Convention was being considered for
signature.  The author is Arkady Shevchenko, the Soviet diplomat who defected to the
United States, and who at the time under discussion was a personal advisor to Soviet Foreign
Minister Gromyko.
 “The military branch responsible for this. . .business has a huge department
in the Defense Ministry.  It has rejected any kind of international control or
oversight.  Several times I asked officials there why they were so adamant.
 The response was always the same:  control was out of the question because
it could reveal the extent of the development of these weapons and would
show Soviet readiness for their eventual use. . . . While the military strongly
opposed any agreement on chemical or biological weapons, the political
leadership, Gromyko in particular, felt it necessary for propaganda purposes
to respond to a proposal by Great Britain to conclude a special separate
convention to prohibit biological warfare as a first step.  The military’s
reaction was to say go ahead and sign the convention;  without international
controls, who would know anyway?  They refused to consider eliminating
their stockpiles and insisted upon further development of these weapons.  The
Politburo approved this approach.  The toothless convention regarding
biological weapons was signed in 1972, but there are no international controls
over the Soviet program, which continues apace.”22
A second is a purely formalistic point, but one which nonetheless represents the
                                                
22 Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow, Ballantine Books, New York City, 1985, pp. 230-231.
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standard approach of any industrial manager or resource allocator in the former Soviet
defense industrial sector.  The example provided was given by a Russian analyst explaining
the response in 1990 to the cuts in defense ministry orders for major conventional weapons:
“The majority of the defense industry managers went into a “wait-and-see”
state.  After all, they were under strict instructions not to tamper with the
military production lines, as almost all of these lines belonged to the reserve
capacity—or mobilization capacity—which by law cannot be sold or
converted to civilian production.”23
This is not too distant from the 1995 remark of a U.S. administration official directly
involved with the Russian BW problem, that “it was easier for them to keep going than to
change.”  As powerful as inertia may be, it does not seem a sufficient explanation for the
contravention of a major arms control treaty for 20 years, and particularly in the political
climate of the 1987 to 1995 period; nevertheless, it undoubtedly was the generic attitude of
Soviet defense industrial managers.  And not only in the Soviet period.  In June 1994,
“. . . Russian First Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin said that the
development of dual-use technology constitutes one of the main priorities in
Russia’s defense conversion effort.  He said that the Defense Ministry, the
State Committee for Defense Industries, and the Economics Ministry were
jointly carrying out research in the practical application of dual-use
technology in hopes of preserving the defense sector’s mobilization potential
and developing a national industrial policy.”24
The production lines for BW agents fit the definition of “dual-use technology” as perfectly
as anything could, and it is just that defense sector “mobilization potential,” which was
referred to in the September 1992 trilateral statement as the “experimental technological lines
for the production of agents,” that the United States and UK want to see dismantled.
The remaining explanations become more operative and functional, and move in a
spectrum from bureaucratic division and inertia, to an explicit strategic purpose on the part
of the Ministry of Defense for having made the BW program in the first place, as well as for
                                                
23 Dr. Alexander Ozhegov, (Analytic Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences) in Lars Wallin (ed.),
Proceedings of a Symposium on the Post-Soviet Military-Industrial Complex, Stockholm, October 20, 1993:
 FOA, The Swedish National Defense Research Establishment, 1994, p. 53.
24 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty News Briefs, 3:27, June 27 - July 1, 1994, p. 5.
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continuing to maintain it.  Some U. S. and UK officials associated with the trilateral process
feel that the Soviets assumed for two decades that they could get away with the violation and
“that it has taken them four years to decide whether to tell the whole story, to write the past
story.”25  In addition, they have had an even longer time—since 1989—to “clean up,”
prepare, remove, consolidate, and move parts of the program.  But “it’s obvious that they
have tried to keep the program.”  It is also pointed out that at any point along the way, Soviet
officials could have argued against disclosure on the grounds that doing so would admit to
the past Soviet violation of the BWC.  That is obviously true, although the argument loses
its meaning with the realization that continuing the program only meant that an even more
damaging disclosure would follow at some point later on.
When President Gorbachev was pressured on the question by the American and
British governments, apparently he was  “stonewalled” by the Soviet military.  His personal
military advisor, General Akhromeyev, was not particularly interested in having the program
ended.  “The General Staff probably gave him a memorandum stating that the United States
is doing the same, and we have to keep the program.”  It appears that the Soviet intelligence
community did not believe that the United States had relinquished its own BW program, that
President Nixon had actually shut it down between 1969 and 1972, before it was necessary
to do so.  The upsurge in U.S. expenditure for BW R&D during the Reagan administration
may also have fed that suspicion.  That increase—of over 500 percent between 1980 and
1986—raised questions in the United States as well, as to whether the program was crossing
the boundary between defensive and offensive R&D.  For the Soviet military, maintaining
any defense capability was desirable.  In addition, secrecy had “worked” in past instances for
the USSR, and in Moscow it was easy to keep the program secret; possibly only a small
number of generals and colonels on the General Staff were involved—perhaps a dozen.  The
decision to put the program under the cover of the Biopreparat was made in 1980, although
the organization had been established some years earlier.  Equally important was the
“paranoid” tradition of the Soviet military culture and secrecy:  “if the United States wants
something of us, they want to hurt us.”  It is possible that Gorbachev may have suggested that
                                                
25 These and the following quotations are taken from interviews in 1994 and 1995 with a half-dozen present or
former government officials—American, British, and Russian—who have been directly involved in the trilateral
process, but who cannot be identified.
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the program be shut down;  at least some reduction in its size did take place between 1986
and 1992.
One is left with the unsatisfactory conclusion that members of the Soviet General
Staff saw a strategic advantage in maintaining the former USSR’s—and then Russia’s—BW
capabilities.  Why they should have thought that—while at the same time being willing to
relinquish SS-20 missiles, large numbers of multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVed)
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), all naval tactical nuclear weapons, tens of
thousands of tanks, etc.—still seems to require an explanation that is impossible to provide.
The Proliferation of Biological Weapons
The years since 1972 and 1975—when the Biological Weapons Convention was
signed and then entered into force—have been a severe disappointment for arms control in
the biological field.  One official U.S. estimate is that “The number of nations having or
suspected of having offensive biological and toxin warfare programs has increased from four
to ten since 1972.”26 And as the same statement noted, some of the 10 nations in question “.
. .are signatories of the BWC.”  A substantial number of these countries are in the Middle
East, and these have either not signed or not ratified the BWC.  In 1992, the Bush
administration made a concerted effort, but failed, in the attempt to convince several of the
major Middle East antagonists to either sign and/or ratify the BW Convention.27
With the exception of both the former USSR—now Russia—and Iraq, (as a result of
                                                
26 Barry J. Erlick (Department of the Army) in Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons, Hearings,
Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, February 9, 1989, page 33.
These numbers were first presented in U.S. government testimony to Congress the year before, in
1988, by Dr. Thomas J. Welch of the U.S. Department of Defense, to the House Committee on Armed Services.
 See also, John H. Cushman Jr., “U.S. Cites Increase in Biological Arms,” New York Times, May 4, 1988.
Another version of this estimate reads, “During the 20 years the BW Convention has existed, the
number of countries considered to be developing or recently engaged in offensive BW programs has risen from
4 in 1972 to 10 in 1992—some of which are members of the convention.”  U.S. and International Efforts to
Ban Biological Weapons, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-93-113, December 1992, pp. 2-3, 16.
27 Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia are parties to the BWC.  Egypt and Syria have signed but not ratified.
 Iraq ratified only after the end of the Gulf War and the UNSCOM process began.  Israel has neither signed nor
ratified.  Iran has ratified, but is widely assumed to be developing biological weapons, and to be in violation,
as Iraq was previously.  It was after the failure of that diplomatic effort that the Bush administration inserted
a few sentences on the BW capabilities of several of the Middle Eastern states in the non-compliance report that
it released in January 1993.  Israel, however, was not mentioned. See also, W. Seth Carus, “‘The Poor Man’s
Atomic Bomb,’ Biological Weapons in the Middle East,” Policy Papers No. 23, Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 1991.
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the Gulf War and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) process which
followed it), there has however been no international pressure or penalty applied against any
of the suspected BW states.  Until around 1988, no national or international spokesperson
even made reference to the development; and since then, it has been virtually only U.S.
spokespeople who have done so.  The statements have been constantly plagued, however,
with ambiguities in their descriptive terminology, such as the words “. . .or suspected of
having. . .” in the statement quoted above.  In 1990, Admiral Trost,  the Chief of Naval
Operations, told Congress that “three countries worldwide now have bacteriological
weapons,” and that 15 others were suspected of developing them.28  Three weeks later the
Director of Naval Intelligence identified Iraq, Syria, and the former USSR as the three
“assessed to have (BW) capability.”29   In 1988, his predecessor, Admiral Studeman, had
also identified China, Taiwan, and North Korea by name.  But what the U.S. government’s
criteria were for the categories of “suspected,” “developing,” and “capability” were never
specified, although in this particular pair of statements “capability” apparently meant
weapons’ possession. 
A statement in the 1992 British Defense White Paper uses the same pattern of
ambiguous phrasing, noting that “about ten (nations) have or are seeking biological
weapons.”  What was worse, according to this author, is that the number of nations
“developing” or with “capability” were frequently aggregated with those doing the same for
chemical weapons.  The facts that one wanted to know explicitly were which nations had
BW R&D programs, which nations had gone into weapons development, and which into
production and stockpiling of weapons and the BW agents to fill them.  That information was
unavailable publicly.30  In 1993, the Russian government released a report which identified
some nations that had biological weapons programs; this report was somewhat more explicit
in categorizing their relative stages of development.31  A larger study on Biological Weapons
Proliferation released by two U.S. government agencies in April 1994 contained only three-
and-a-half pages out of 90 with information on specific BW-proliferating nations, and
                                                
28 Adm. C. A. H. Trost, House Armed Services Committee, February 20, 1990, p. 5.
29 Rear Adm. T. A. Brooks, House Armed Services Committee, March 14, 1990, p. 54.
30 The Chemical and Biological Weapons Elimination Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-182) requires an annual report by
the president to Congress that contains a complete list of known or suspected BW programs, including those
that are classified.
31 “Proliferation Issues:  A New Challenge After the Cold War, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Report, (translation), JPRS-TND-93-007, March 5, 1993.
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contained little that was not already in the public domain.32  Notably, in 1994, two senior
U.S. government officials stated in private meetings that no nation was then known to be
producing and stockpiling BW agents.  Iraq had been doing so, but as a result of the Gulf
War in 1991, presumably it has not been doing so since then.  Some countries apparently
have BW production and assembly facilities, but they have been  maintaining them in a
standby capacity, and—at least in 1994—were not actually producing BW agents in them.
 Whether such countries had tested weapons and tested the production lines, etc., again
remained unstated, but one would have to presume that they had.  In June 1995, Anthony
Cordesman, an informed analyst with extensive past access to classified information, stated
that “Iran. . .is at the point of weaponizing its biological warfare capabilities.”33 
“Weaponizing” would presume production.  (See section on Iran which begins on page 44.)
It seems impossible to make an adequate survey of the status of BW proliferation
from the information available in open, unclassified sources.  U.S. government resistance to
releasing any information on this subject has been particularly severe.  Several years of 
attempts to obtain the declassification of some Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) reports
dealing with North Korean capabilities dating from 1975 resulted in little more than a title
page, many blank pages, and one paragraph which reported that North Korea had a national
Academy of Sciences.  Individuals with access to classified information nevertheless  imply
clearly that there are a substantial number of active BW programs and that these involve a
wide range of agents and the parameters of agent dissemination, survival, etc.  How many
of these national programs involve agent and weapons production, it is impossible to say.
 There is a notable contrast with nuclear weapons proliferation, in which it is unquestionably
U.S. government policy to specifically and publicly identify by name—at least tardily—those
nations with nuclear weapons development programs.  That seems not, however, to be the
case regarding biological (or chemical) weapons, in which the available information is
minimal, frequently ambiguous, or altogether lacking.
It is interesting to look for a moment at the historical record of allegations regarding
                                                
32 “Biological Weapons Proliferation,” Technical Report, U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases and the Defense Nuclear Agency, April 1994.  See also, “Technical Aspects of Biological Weapons
Proliferation,” Chapter 3 in Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction, Office of Technology
Assessment, U.S. Congress, December 1993, pp. 71-117, and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:
 Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, 1993.
33 Samuel F. Wells, Jr., “Scholars Critical of U.S. Policy Toward Iran,” The Woodrow Wilson Center Report,
7:3, November 1995, p. 5.  Cordesman’s previous pronouncements on BW proliferation in advance of U.S.
government disclosures—in the case of Iraq—proved accurate.
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national BW programs, and their eventual resolution:
! U.S. allegations between 1976 and the early 1990s of a Soviet program—and even
of a continuing Russian one—proved to have been correct.  The Soviet denials were
false.
! Israeli and other allegations in the late 1980s regarding the Iraqi program proved
to have been correct, and the years of Iraqi denials—both before and after 
1990—were false.34
There are several differences in the lists that have been produced by U.S. and Russian
intelligence agencies of nations alleged to have BW programs, and it will be interesting to
see the eventual resolution of these discrepancies.
Also there are two major historical allegations of BW use in the post-World War II
period.  On both occasions the United States was charged with having used BW.  The USSR,
China, and North Korea accused the United States of using BW during the Korean War;35
 Cuba accused the United States of using BW over a period of decades.  In both cases, the
allegations included the total panoply of BW agents:  anti-human, anti-plant (crops), and
anti-animal (domesticated).36  The USSR periodically made other charges that the United
States had used BW (in the early 1950s, against crops in Eastern Europe;  in 1964, in
Colombia;  in 1968, in Vietnam).  The United States has denied all of these charges that are
nearly universally considered by the international arms control community, as well as by
specialists in the fields of microbiology and epidemiology, to be fraudulent and
propagandistic allegations.  Because of the severely detrimental effect on arms control of
fraudulent allegations, the major charges dealing with the Korean War, as well as the Cuban
ones, should have received more serious examination long before this time.  These
allegations should be either definitively uncovered or definitively disclosed to have been
fraudulent.
Of more immediate and practical importance is the question of the degree to which
                                                
34 “Israel Vows Action Against Iraqi Germ Research,” Washington Times, January 19, 1989.  (Israeli sources
presumably provided the information that was carried in several ABC-TV news reports at roughly the same
time.)
35 Milton Leitenberg, “Allegations of Biological Warfare in China and Korea, 1951-1952,” The Prevention of
CBW, Vol. 5, in The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute, 1971, pp. 238-258.
36  All of the Cuban charges are summarized, as are other post-WorldWar II Soviet allegations of BW use made
against the United States, on p. 183 of Milton Leitenberg, “A Return to Sverdlovsk:  Allegations of Soviet
Activities Related to Biological Weapons,” Arms Control, 12:2 , September 1991.
20 / Biological Weapons Arms Control
BW proliferating states need, obtain, and benefit from technology transfers from
industrialized states.  For example,
“Given Iraq’s relatively primitive scientific and industrial base in
biotechnology, the BTW programme relied initially on access to foreign
technology and expertise.  Companies from France, West Germany, the
Soviet Union, and the United States played important—and only partly
unwittingly—roles in Baghdad’s efforts to acquire biological weapons.”37
The Syrian BW program appears to have depended on, and benefited from, similar
technology transfers.  The issue is of immediate significance for two reasons: (1) the
continued pressure at BWC Review Conferences and preparatory meetings for additional
biotechnology transfers under Article 10 of the Convention, and (2) most particularly, the
constant harping on this issue above all by Iran, a nation now suspected of having an active
BW program.
There are several aspects to the problem:  transfer of plant and equipment,
technology, and knowledge, including foreign scientists working in another country’s BW
program.  In the last category, the emigration of former Soviet BW scientists to Iran or other
Middle East countries (and some former Soviet BW scientists have gone to developing
countries), and South Africans to Libya, has been the more recent concern. 
Questions can also be raised, however, about U.S. government practices in earlier
years.  Some of these may very well have taken place in the way the U.S. Atoms for Peace
program diffused knowledge regarding nuclear technologies, which particular recipient
countries may  have subsequently redirected to research in their nuclear weapons
development programs.  For example, in 1967, U.S. military services maintained seven
overseas laboratories doing research on infectious diseases;  the Army, four; the Navy, two;
and the Air Force, one, with a total of over 885 foreign national employees.  Did the U.S.
Naval Medical Research Units (NAMRU) groups situated in Taiwan and Egypt—and in part
staffed by local scientists—gradually stimulate local government interest in BW?38  Although
a NAMRU unit was never situated in Israel, in some years the U.S. Department of Defense
                                                
37  J. Tucker, op. cit., p. 237.
38  The U.S. Army facility in Thailand employed 325 foreign nationals; the Navy (NAMRU) lab in Taiwan, 285;
and in Egypt, 156,  The Participation of Federal Agencies in International Scientific Programs,  Report,
Committee on Science and Astronautics, U.S. House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 1st Session, 1967, pp.
132-133.
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simultaneously provided research contracts to Israeli and to Egyptian scientists on subjects
related to BW.
Each year some 300 to 400 foreign visitors visit the laboratory facilities of
USAMRIID at Fort Detrick, Maryland.39  Others visit DoD contractor laboratories.  The great
majority of these visits are simply short, day-long tours of the laboratories; a very few come
to work on projects of up to a year.  There are two contradictory ways to appraise the
potential of such visits:  they could be considered excellent and desirable confidence-
building measures (CBMs), precisely fitting one of the categories of CBMs developed in
recent years under the BWC to demonstrate the transparency of national programs.  On the
other hand, they could be considered to carry the risk of transferring knowledge to a potential
BW proliferator.  There are reportedly a substantial number of Iranian scientists working at
the Cuban national biotechnology institute:  given the existing strong suspicions of an Iranian
BW program, their presence as researchers in another nation’s laboratory is far more likely
to provide assistance to Iranian proliferation than to produce any benefits of Cuban
transparency.
The training personnel that accompany turnkey plants, and other technical personnel
supplied by contractors for at least the initial operation, maintenance, and production, are an
obvious path of technology transfer—aside from the equipment itself—to any nation
developing a BW program.  (It seems that technical personnel from West Germany
performed this role in Iraq.)  The Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI) of
November 1990 enacted by the U.S. administration was aimed at controlling the transfer of
dual-use technology relevant to biological weapons (as well as chemical and nuclear
weapons).40  Its promulgation very likely owed something to the developments in Iraq, but
it was primarily motivated by the fact that the Bush administration had vetoed legislation that
would have strengthened U.S. nonproliferation policies.  In addition, the Bush administration
opposed both the Omnibus Export Administration Act of 1991 and the Nonproliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1992. The first
encouraged international sanctions against countries that used chemical or biological
                                                
39 Of 122 foreign visitors selected for a survey in the two years between June 1988 and June 1990, 33 came
from the United Kingdom, but the next highest number, 28, came from Israel, and eight from China. Defense
Research:  Protecting Sensitive Data and Material at 10 Chemical and Biological Laboratories, U.S.
Government Accounting Office, NSIAD-91-57, July 1991, p. 21.
40 Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation;  Executive Order 12735, November 16, 1990. See also, Fact
Sheet on Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative,  The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, December
13, 1990.
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weapons in violation of international law, and the  second would have denied funding to
international development institutions until such institutions revoked the membership of
countries that did not adhere to nuclear, chemical, and biological nonproliferation regimes.41
 The administration opposed both on the grounds that mandatory legislated sanctions would
be an infringement on presidential authority.  Neither measure was approved by Congress.
 Nevertheless, amendments to the provisions of the Arms Control Export Act that were
passed by Congress—and were not vetoed—contained requirements that mandated major
U.S. sanctions against a country that used chemical or biological weapons.  Unfortunately,
the same legislation provided the president with the authority to waive the mandatory
sanctions on the grounds of U.S. national security.42  The value of legislated mandates had
been made clear in 1989.  The United States had accused Iraq of using chemical weapons
against the Kurdish population inside Iraq in August 1988.  Those allegations led the U.S.
Senate to pass legislation imposing economic sanctions on Iraq, overriding strong objections
to the legislation by the U.S. Department of State during the Bush administration.  Early in
1989, although government officials admitted that they believed Iraq was developing
biological agents, they said “. . .that they do not want to get into another public feud with the
Iraqis” over the issue—and nothing was done.43
The remainder of this section on proliferation is composed of summaries of the
available knowledge regarding specific countries having biological weapons development
programs.
IRAQ
Iraq signed the Biological Weapons Convention on May 11, 1972;  however it never
went on to ratify the Treaty until 1991, after its defeat in the Gulf War.  In July 1989, a U.S.
administration spokesman was questioned by a member of a congressional committee who
noted that in recent months there had been a series of reports on growing Iraqi capabilities
                                                
41 Non-Proliferation Regimes:  Policies to Control the Spread of Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Weapons
and Missiles, Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, CRS-FAND, March
1993, pp. 37-38.
42 It is known that the administration has provided Congress with many classified notifications of violations of
provisions of the act.  Due to the classification of these notifications, it is not known if any of the violations
pertain to the BW provisions of the act, or to other provisions, and if so, what nation may be responsible, or
whether any of the five possible sanctions have been invoked or waived.
43 David B. Ottaway, “Official Denies Iraq Has Germ War Plant,” Washington Post, January 19, 1989.
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in biological and nuclear weapons. The administration spokesman replied,
“We are concerned by indications that Iraq is seeking to develop a biological
military capability.  However, we have no evidence that Iraq has violated the
1972 Convention on Biological Warfare. Under that convention,
‘prophylactic research’ is permitted.”44
The response apparently was very much in error, and contrary information was
available to the U.S. government and to several other governments at the time that it was
made.  In January 1989, an aide to Senator John McCain, Anthony Cordesman, who had
access to classified information, stated that Western intelligence agencies “. . . would affirm
that Iraq has biological agents in actual production and is stockpiling them for military
use.”45  He wrote that there was evidence at the end of 1988 that Iraq “. . . was producing
botulinum toxin in military quantities, or some similar agent.”46  In the same month,
Secretary of State George Shultz disclosed the Iraqi BW “capability” and the West German
government corroborated it.47  In 1992 Human Rights Watch disclosed the finding of a
document captured by Kurdish forces in Northern Iraq that they interpreted as evidence that
Iraq had deployed biological weapons in the field during its war with Iran.48  Following the
Persian Gulf War, the U.S. Department of Defense’s official report to Congress stated: 
“By the time of the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had developed biological
weapons.  Its advanced and aggressive biological warfare program was the
most extensive in the Arab world. . . .[T]he program probably began in the
late 1970s and concentrated on development of two agents—botulinum toxin
and anthrax bacteria. . . .Large scale production of these agents began in 1989
                                                
44 Developments in the Middle East; July 1989;  Hearing, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, July 12, 1989, p. 88.
45 Anthony Cordesman, remarks to ABC News, January 17, 1989, quoted in Seth Carus, The Genie Unleashed:
 Iraq’s Chemical and Biological Weapons Program,  Policy Papers #14, Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, 1989, p. 29.
46 Anthony Cordesman, “Creating Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Armed Forces Journal, February 1989, p.
56.
47 Thomas F. O’Boyle, “Bonn Backs U.S. Charge That Iraq Can Produce Biological Weapons,” Wall Street
Journal, January 23, 1989.  Sec. Shultz’s remarks were made around January 18, 1989.
48 Letter to Rolf Ekeus, Chairman, UNSCOM, December 29, 1992, 10 pages, Human Rights Watch.  The Iraqi
document is dated March 8, 1986, and asks military units to supply an inventory “. . . of Biological and
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at four facilities near Baghdad.  Delivery means for biological agents ranged
from simple aerial bombs and artillery rockets to surface-to-surface
missiles.”49
Before ground combat in Iraq began, official U.S. pronouncements had shifted
completely to unqualified statements of Iraq’s possession of biological weapons.  In
September 1990, CIA Director William Webster publicly stated that Iraq had a “sizeable
stockpile” of biological weapons, and “U.S. intelligence sources have reported that Iraq has
produced a stockpile of biological weapons and will have a ‘militarily significant number’
of them ready for battlefield use in a few months. . . . Officials said that Iraq had worked
intensively the past two years to develop a biological weapons program. . . .”50  The United
States initiated a crash program to produce an anthrax vaccine and to inoculate U.S. service
personnel deployed to the Persian Gulf.  Obviously the government felt that it had uncovered
sufficient information to be convinced that anthrax was one of the agents that the Iraqi BW
program had developed for use.51
The subsequent disclosure of the nature and dimensions of Iraq’s BW program would
not have come about if not for Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War and the subsequent
unprecedented resolutions by the U.N. Security Council that imposed a series of demands
and constraints on Iraq’s military capabilities.  These provided for the ability to go anywhere
within Iraq at any time to search for and to destroy all of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
in all categories, and to assure that they could not be reconstituted.52
                                                
49  The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War:  Final Report to Congress, Washington D.C., U.S. Department of
Defense, April 1992;  pages 18-19;  quoted in  Jonathan B. Tucker, “The Future of Biological Warfare,” in
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Responses, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., 1992, p. 54.
Despite the presence of Soviet technical specialists of various sorts in Iraq until the beginning of the
Gulf War bombing campaign at the end of 1990, and having expert Russian personnel participating in the
UNSCOM BW inspection teams in Iraq, as late as 1993 the Russian F.I.S. proliferation report was coy on the
question of Iraq’s previous possession of BW.  It expressed skepticism of the “conjecture” that Iraq had
developed or produced BW weapons.
50 Molly Moore, “Iraq Said to Have Supply of Biological Weapons,” Washington Post, September 29, 1990.
51 Malcolm W. Browne, “Army Reported Ready for Iraqi Germ Warfare,” New York Times, January 6, 1991.
52      “. . . 8.  Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless,
under international supervision, of:  a) all chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all
related subsystems and components and all research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. . .
“9.  Decides, for the implementation of paragraph 8 above, the following: 
(a) Iraq shall submit to the Secretary-General, within 15 days of the adoption of this resolution, a
declaration of the locations, amounts, and types of all items specified in paragraph 8, and agree to urgent, on-
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Iraq informed the UNSCOM 7 inspection team that visited Salman Pak in August
1991 that BW-related work had begun there in mid-1986 and had ended in the autumn of
1990, with all research materials destroyed at that time.  The UNSCOM team decided,
however, that the program had started earlier, probably in 1983, as that was the year in which
the construction of Salman Pak had been completed.  The facility included the special
construction of an aerosol test chamber which had been used for testing botulinum toxin.53
 But once again, first impressions regarding Iraq’s BW program underwent a
significant change in the course of several years’ experience.  Writing in early 1992, the
special advisor to UNSCOM wrote, “The destruction of biological weapons capabilities has
not posed any problem.  The relevant major facilities were completely destroyed later during
the hostilities.”54  Two years later, by the end of 1994, it was apparent that determining
exactly what Iraq had done in the way of biological weapons, where it had been done, and
whether or not it was completely gone had turned out to be the most elusive task for
UNSCOM to resolve.  Rather than having been “completely destroyed,” Iraq’s BW plant had
been dismantled by Iraq itself, with some portions obliterated and others cached.  For one-
year-and a-half Iraq denied having any BW program at all, and once it admitted that position
to have been false, its successive series of submissions to UNSCOM over a period of two-
and-a-half additional years were—one after the other—considered misinformation for the
greatest part.  As it eventually turned out—in August 1995—that was definitely the case.  At
the end of 1994 a report to the U.N. Security Council by the U.N. Secretary General had
stated,
                                                                                                                                                
site inspection as specified below. . .
          (i) The forming of a Special Commission, which shall carry out immediate on-site inspection of
Iraq’s biological, chemical, and missile capabilities, based on Iraq’s declarations and the designation of any
additional locations by the Special Commission itself;  (ii) the yielding by Iraq of possession to the Special
Commission for destruction, removal, or rending harmless. . .
“10.  Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any
of the items specified in paragraphs 8 and 9 above and requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the
Special Commission, to develop a plan for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq’s compliance
with this paragraph, to be submitted to the Council for approval within 120 days of the passage of this
resolution.”
53 Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, No. 13, September 1991, p. 22. 
The 1983 date would also corroborate the statement by an Iraqi microbiologist who defected to Iran
and claimed that Iraq had developed and tested biological agents as early as 1983.  Shyam Bhata, “Iraq Scientist
Tells 10-Year Secret,” The Observer, August 9, 1992.
54 Johan Molander, “The United Nations and the Elimination of Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction:  The
Implementation of a Cease-Fire Condition,” in From Versailles to Baghdad:  Post-War Armament Control of
Defeated States, Fred Tanner (ed.), United Nations (UNIDIR), New York, 1992, p. 151.
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“. . . Iraq’s attitude to the provision of data and supporting evidence still fell
far short of its obligation to provide full, final, and complete disclosures of
its past proscribed programmes and of its current and recent dual-purpose
capabilities subject to ongoing monitoring and verification.  It appears that
many of Iraq’s declarations are incomplete and sometimes contradictory.  The
Commission has both direct and indirect evidence that Iraq is still failing to
declare equipment and material acquired for and capable of use in proscribed
programmes and that its accounts of certain of its projects do not reflect their
true purpose and their role as part of now proscribed weapons programmes.
 In general, in relation to past programmes, Iraq has not volunteered
information and has shown marked lack of transparency, disclosing
information only when confronted with evidence by the Commission.  Iraq
maintains its claim, not believed by the Commission, that it has destroyed all
documentation related to these programmes and that no other tangible proofs
exist to support its accounts.  Indeed, events of the past six months have
strengthened the Commission’s conviction that important documentation still
exists and that the Iraqi authorities have taken the conscious decision not to
release it freely to the Commission.  In any case, Iraq has not fulfilled its
undertaking to resolve all outstanding issues in relation to the past
programmes in parallel with the establishment of ongoing monitoring and
verification.  The importance of doing so has been repeatedly impressed upon
Iraq at each of the high-level meetings referred to above, as has the need for
Iraq to provide documentation and supporting evidence.”55
The UNSCOM report of December 15, 1994, demonstrated—by the exquisite use of
Iraq’s own misstatements and utter ineptness—that Iraq had been persistently lying in its
submissions on BW to UNSCOM and continued to do so.56  In addition, Rolf Ekeus,
executive chairman of UNSCOM, stated that Iraq’s troop build-up along the Kuwait border
in the fall of 1994, which produced a responding U.S. force deployment, was designed to
pressure the United Nations into halting its insistence that Iraq divulge all information on its
past BW program.57  Finally, at the end of 1994, UNSCOM discovered that Iraq had
                                                
55 United Nations Security Council, Note by the Secretary General, S/1994/1422, December 15, 1994, pp. 3-4.
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procured 39 tons of bacteriological growth media in 1988 alone, and additional quantities in
1989, as well as high technology fermenters and spray drying and weapons filling machinery.
 The data regarding these purchases was supplied by some of the countries whose firms had
made the sales—but not until the winter of 1994. The growth media had been imported in
large bulk packaging—not in the smaller packaging sizes customarily used for domestic
medical uses—in quantities 40 times larger than Iraq’s declared annual requirements, and the
whereabouts of about half of that media—or its products—were still unaccounted for.58 
Ekeus’ comment was “This can only coincide with the production of biological weapons.”59
The denouement came in two steps, in July and in August 1995.  The first, and
smaller step came in July.  Very likely at the strong urging of France, Russia, and China—all
of whom favored ending the sanctions on Iraqi oil sales and on imports, which Iraq was
continuously demanding should be revoked—Iraq finally admitted to having had an offensive
BW program.  The Iraqi government stated the following:
! It had produced very large quantities of anthrax and botulinum toxin.
! The production site had been Al Hakam, which had never been bombed.
! “Iraq never had bombs or other weapons that could be filled with either of the 
agents.”
! The stockpiles of both agents had been destroyed in the fall of 1990 before the Gulf
War, “to prevent contamination of the Iraqi countryside during enemy bombing 
raids.”
! The program was originated in 1985, at a supposed pesticide plant at Muhanna, one
site of Iraq’s CW munitions production.  R&D continued there for a year, and then
was transferred to the German constructed laboratories at Salman Pak.
! Agent production began in 1989, a year after the end of the Iran-Iraq war.
All this was reported to Rolf Ekeus, verbally, in half an hour.  No evidence to 
support any of the claims was presented;  Iraq promised to provide details in a written report
                                                                                                                                                
October 27, 1994.
58 United Nations, Security Council, Note by the Secretary General and Annex, S/1995/284, April 10, 1995,
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at the end of July.60  On July 17, Iraq also said that it would cease cooperating with
UNSCOM inspectors unless economic sanctions against Iraq were lifted by the end of
August.  On August 4, Iraq presented yet another “Full, Final and Complete Disclosure” of
530 pages to UNSCOM; its details were never made public, but it followed the verbal
presentation of the previous month, and still insisted that no weaponization had taken place.61
Within days, Iraq was forced to make far more significant disclosures.  On August
7, Lt. General Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, Saddam Hussein’s son-in-law and the former
head of Iraq’s entire program of development and production of weapons of mass
destruction—nuclear, chemical, and BW—defected to Jordan, together with his brother, (also
a Saddam son-in-law), their families, and some 15 additional military officers.62  After failing
both in an attempt to obtain the defector’s return and then in an apparent assassination
attempt, Iraq asked Rolf Ekeus on August 16 to come to Baghdad and offered “100 percent
compliance” and withdrew the deadline for ending cooperation.  In the circumstance of
potential disclosures by the most well-informed defector possible, the Iraqi government
decided to preempt that eventuality by making the disclosures itself.  They contradicted even
the information provided to UNSCOM only a month before in July:
! Within days after the U.N. Security Council Resolution in December 1990
authorizing the United States and a coalition of nations to wage war against Iraq,
Iraq had loaded anthrax, botulinum, and aflatoxin on nearly 200 bombs and
SCUD missile warheads.  (Fifty bombs and 10 SCUD missiles with anthrax, 100
bombs and 15 missile warheads with botulinum, and 16 bombs with aflatoxin—or
165 bombs and 25 missiles.)
! The weapons were destroyed—allegedly—in July and August 1991, more than four
months after the war’s end.
! Iraq had also experimented with a drone aircraft BW delivery system, but in the 
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end had decided to arm the other systems.  Thus, three BW delivery systems had 
been developed.
! BW production sites were hidden “in ordinary factories and engineering centers.”
 Seven BW agents had been tested for possible use, research on three viruses had 
begun, and production of agents had taken place at four other sites in addition to Al-
Hakam. (Three of these were identified in 1995 as Al Kindi, Taji, and Salman Pak.)63
! Iraq had produced 10 times more anthrax than it had previously admitted to 
(presumably, in its August 4 report).
! Iraq had also developed “a wheat pathogen”—which UNSCOM later reported to
be wheat rust—as well as a mycotoxin.
! Iraq didn’t use the BW weapons it had armed due to a warning of massive U.S. 
retaliation if Iraq used weapons of mass destruction.  The warning was delivered by
U.S. Secretary of State Baker to Iraq’s then Secretary of State Tariq Aziz in Geneva
in January 1991.  At the time, the United States was actually concerned about the 
possible use of chemical weapons by Iraq.  Aziz claimed the Iraqi leadership 
interpreted the U.S. threat as a possible use of nuclear weapons.
! Finally, in a “comic encore,” as they drove Ekeus to the airport, Iraqi officials 
stopped at a chicken farm and gave UNSCOM 140 cartons containing 5,500  
documents, tapes, and other materials that they had “just discovered,” claiming that
the defector, General Kamel, had hidden them from UNSCOM.64
On October 11, 1995, UNSCOM’s report based on the half-million pages of
documents that Iraq had handed over in August was presented to the U.N. Security Council.65
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 Aside from the details already indicated—all of which were repeated in the report in more
detail including the amounts of BW agents that Iraq had produced—there were several
additional points of particular importance.  First, the Iraqi government had made a policy
decision as early as 1974 to acquire biological weapons, only two years after having signed
the Biological Weapons Convention.  R and D began in 1975, but was suspended in 1978.
 The program was restarted in 1985.  Second, of course, the Iraqi government had lied in
claiming that all documentation had been destroyed in 1991.  The newly delivered
documents, however, were for the most part only from individual research and production
centers, and several major categories of files were still missing: those from the major central
policy and management agencies, the Military Industrialization Corporation, and the Ministry
of Defense.  Third, UNSCOM was skeptical of the detailed progression of the BW R&D
program from the mid-1980s to l990 that Iraq had described:  “Given the Iraqi claim that
only five years had elapsed since its declared inception in 1985, the achievements of Iraq’s
biological weapons program were remarkable.”  Finally, UNSCOM indicated even greater
skepticism regarding Iraq’s description of when and how it had destroyed the filled BW
munitions.  Iraq claimed that the order for the destruction had been given orally, that there
were no records of the destruction, and that Iraqi officials were contradictory about the dates
of the destruction and unable to identify the site at which it taken place.
The most critical issues that the report made clear, however, were the following:
! UNSCOM found that Iraq’s submissions still continued to be deficient and that the
data available from “. . .other sources. . .does not correspond in important aspects to
 the information provided by Iraq” regarding its BW programs.  It was clear that large
categories of documentary files were still being withheld.
! The “clear deception” that Iraq had practiced before: Iraq had been lying about its
other programs in weapons of mass destruction.
! And that UNSCOM had been fooled, and had previously accepted Iraq’s
submissions in the nuclear, chemical, and ballistic missile areas.
UNSCOM’s realization of that embarrassment was obviously going to make it extremely
reluctant to make the same mistake a second time.
On December 17, 1995, UNSCOM released another report, which included the
following remarks on Iraq’s BW program:
“The draft full, final and complete disclosures of November was Iraq’s
third official declaration in the biological weapons area submitted this year.
 The November document encompasses the disclosures made by Iraq since
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August 1995, primarily its admission of a comprehensive and well-advanced
offensive biological weapons programme, ranging from research and
development on a variety of bacteriological agents, viruses and toxins
through the production, weaponization and military deployment of biological
and toxin weapons. . . .Iraq continues to find additional documents which it
is providing to the Commission to substantiate its declarations.  The
Government of Iraq has assigned high-ranking officials from its biological
weapons programme to lead and participate in discussions with the
Commission’s representatives.
“Notwithstanding the above positive steps, the November draft contains
major deficiencies in structure and content.  Serious gaps and omissions exist
in the declaration and in the documentary support, especially related to
biological warfare agent and munitions production, munition filling and the
destruction of weaponized and bulk agents. . . .Evidence available to the
Commission establishes that the biological weapons programme was more
extensive than has been admitted by Iraq in its November document. . . .The
documentation provided by Iraq. . .constitute only a fraction of the documents
generated under the biological weapons programme.  The Commission
continues to believe that important documents are still being withheld by
Iraq, despite assurances of full cooperation from the Government of Iraq.
“The Commission is especially concerned by Iraq’s continuing failure to
provide definite figures on amounts of biological weapons agents and
munitions produced, weaponized and destroyed.  In the absence of such
figures, accompanied by supporting documentation, it is not possible to
establish a material balance of proscribed items, nor is it possible for the
Commission to provide an assessment to the Security Council that Iraq does
not retain biological weapons agents and munitions.
“Security Council resolution 687 (1991) requires that Iraq unconditionally
accept the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under [the]
Commission’s supervision of all biological weapons and all stocks of agents
and related substances and components and all research, development,
support and manufacturing facilities. . . .Meanwhile, the Commission has
requested Iraq to cease all activities at the facilities in question that have
made a major contribution to the biological weapons programme and still
have significant equipment present.  Iraq has begun to do so.”66
Aside from the particulars of the disclosures, there were several major lessons in this
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four-year escapade, but clearly still not its final denouement.  First, the Iraqi government had
lied continuously, even as late as in its July 6, 1995,  “disclosures” and its August 4, 1995,
“Full, Final, and Complete Disclosure.”  Iraq’s credibility is nil, and everything must be
verified.  Second—under conditions of a police state determined to lie—that UNSCOM and
the inspections were not able to turn up major portions of the relevant evidence regarding
documents, culture media, research personnel, destruction or non-destruction of agents,
etc.—but only strong suspicions as a result of discrepancies.  Ekeus’ deputy noted in August
1995 that “Iraq has now acknowledged a much more extensive program than UNSCOM had
been able to piece together over four years through a process of gathering independent
information outside the country and then confronting Iraq with it.”67  Eventually it was
learned that Iraq had weaponized four different BW agents, in four different delivery
systems—missiles, rockets, bombs, and artillery—and that these had been forward deployed
with Iraqi military forces.  The senior Iraqi military officials that defected in August 1995,
made it apparent that Iraq had nevertheless been deterred from using its BW weapons by
messages from U.S. officials that the Iraqi leadership accepted as serious warnings.  Finally,
that it would have been catastrophic to have revoked the sanctions. Prior to UNSCOM’s
absolute certainty that Iraq had thoroughly complied with the original provisions of the U.N.
Security Council’s resolution, Iraq had continuously demanded revocation and its U.N.
Security Council advocates—Russia, France, and China—had urged the same.68  Clearly,
Iraq had hoped to get the economic sanctions lifted without fully disclosing its BW program,
and despite other unresolved issues regarding its production of chemical weapons and
ballistic missiles.  In March 1996, UNSCOM reported that it believed Iraq was hiding 16
ballistic missiles.  The defection of General Kamel in August 1995, ruined that plan.  After
the disclosures by General Kamel and the new unresolved issues that they and the latest Iraqi
documents raised, France and Russia privately informed Iraq that there was no chance in the
near future that the U.N. Security Council would lift the sanctions that prevented Iraq’s
export of oil.  Only following that did Iraq inform the United Nations in mid-January 1996,
that it was willing to discuss accepting the previous offers by the U.N. Security Council to
permit it to export $2 billion of oil, under controlled conditions, and it began discussions
with the United Nations for that purpose on February 7, 1996.
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The developments at the end of 1995 still left some of the basic questions concerning
Iraq’s BW program unanswered or only partly answered:
(1) Where did the production equipment come from, as well as the cultures for R&D
and production?
(2) How many scientists worked in the program and at what institutions;  where were
they trained?
(3) Was there external assistance by non-Iraqi scientists, or technology transfer, in
addition to the purchase of technology?
(4) What organisms were developed for weapons systems, and how far did 
weaponization go;  for which kinds of munitions or delivery systems, and how large
was the stockpile?
Partial information for some of these parameters is known, but to an important degree
more complete answers are still unknown or not in the public domain and await further
reports from UNSCOM.
Equipment and Agents
Equipment, technology, and materials were procured from France, West Germany,
the former USSR, and the United States.69  In November 1974, Iraq contracted with the
Institute Merieux for the establishment of Iraq’s first vaccine production plant, primarily for
veterinary vaccines, including anthrax.  In the late 1970s, a second French company built a
second vaccine plant, with very substantial overcapacity.  In 1980-1981 Iraq contracted with
a West German Thyssen subsidiary to build the laboratory facilities at Salman Pak. 
Fermenters and bacterial strains were purchased beginning in 1985.  Nearly 50 bacterial
culture samples were bought between 1985 and 1989 from the American Type Culture
Collection.70  Other bacterial cultures were also procured from France and Great Britain.  In
1989 Iraq bought a wide variety of biotechnology equipment from various German supply
firms, and additional fermenters, also from Germany.  Altogether, 24 West German firms
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were involved in the construction of production facilities for biological and chemical
weapons in Iraq, with the chemical weapons production infrastructure by far the larger of the
two.71  UNSCOM believed that Iraq may have been working with the organisms that produce
anthrax, botulinum toxin, gas gangrene, brucella, tularemia, tetanus, cholera, tuberculosis,
and plague, as well as three organisms for simulant R&D.72  During the late 1980s, U.S.
intelligence services reportedly tracked the exports of dual-use equipment that could be used
for producing biological weapons agents from European countries to Iraq, and concluded that
Iraq had spent approximately $100 million on its BW program between 1980 and 1990, and
at the time of its invasion of Kuwait, was producing and stockpiling BW agents at perhaps
a dozen sites within Iraq.73  Iraq had also procured 15 agricultural sprayers from an Italian
firm for use for bacterial insecticide spraying by aircraft.
Personnel
According to its disclosures to UNSCOM, Iraq claimed to have operated and
managed this entire program with one or two doctorate level, and one-to-three master’s level,
scientists, in addition to about 100 laboratory technicians and a larger number of support
personnel.74  Another report indicated that Iraq reported to UNSCOM that “10 scientists” had
been engaged in the BW program.75  This is extremely implausible, if not to say impossible,
judging by nothing more than the number of culture types that were acquired.  This is one
area in particular in which one can expect to see further disclosures.  By the end of 1995,
UNSCOM believed that it had identified additional personnel that had worked in the BW
program.  The cultures were procured by a half-dozen nominal institutions or ministries, but
these may have been way stations to the laboratories that actually received and worked with
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the cultures.  Salman Pak is assumed to have been one of these sites.
The individual that Iraq declared to have been the head of their BW program, Dr.
Rihab Taha, took her doctorate degree at a British university.  However, if there were a far
greater number of scientists involved in the Iraqi BW program than has so far been declared,
it would seem plausible that Dr. Taha was not likely to have been the program’s head.  In
circumstances where it is generally assumed that Iraq did not make a full disclosure of its
past activities, presumably Iraqi officials would not have chosen to make the actual BW
program head the brunt of UNSCOM’s questioning. 
Iraq usually sent its students for training in microbiology to European universities,
particularly British ones.  Iraq has six medical schools that could be presumed to have
Departments of Pharmacology and/or Microbiology in their faculty, in addition to several
technological institutes that might also be able to train researchers in relevant disciplines.
 It has been estimated that there may be 20-30 microbiological scientists in Iraq at the Ph.D.
level, with an additional number in teaching positions in universities, and between 50 and
100 with master’s degrees.  Additionally, scientists in many other disciplines could have
participated in different aspects of a BW R&D program.  In its August 1995 disclosures, Iraq
detailed exactly such collaboration and assistance to its BW program by some of its other
weapons development institutes and personnel:  weaponization was carried out with the
assistance of Iraq’s chemical weapons establishment at Muthanna.
External Assistance
It has been suggested that European companies were misled, unknowingly, to provide
the basic infrastructure of Iraq’s BW program.  Certainly, technical experts would have
remained at the sites constructed as turnkey plants, to ensure that start-up proceeded properly,
to see that plant personnel were trained and that equipment was maintained properly.  In
addition to the West German and French equipment referred to previously, Iraq also
reportedly procured fermenters from an Italian company, Olsa, and from a Swiss company,
Chemak.76  A West German television report in January 1989 claimed that “. . . scientists and
technicians from the Federal Republic had helped in the construction of a biological weapons
factory south of the Iraqi capital,” which could have been either Salman Pak or Al-Hakam.77
 When the issue was raised by the social democratic party (SPD) opposition in the German
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parliament, the government replied that it “. . . has no real proof usable in court of
involvement by German firms and senior employees in the development of bacteriological
weapons in Iraq.”  No further details have appeared about the numbers of West German
personnel who were in Iraq, how long they were there, and precisely what they did—beyond
the identification of several of the construction firms noted previously.
In 1994, R. James Woolsey, then Director of  Central Intelligence (CIA), stated that
the Iraqi BW capability hadn’t been harmed by the war or by the inspections.  Al-Hakam had
escaped bombing in 1991, and its equipment was partially removed to warehouse storage
after the war’s end to sites which have since been visited by UNSCOM inspectors.  Writing
early in 1993, an assistant to the director of UNSCOM summarized the inspection and
control situation at that time in a most pessimistic light:
“Iraq signed up to the cease-fire conditions in the U.N. Security Council
Resolution 687.  While this resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the
Charter, and hence binding on all states, including Iraq, and remains so, Iraq
was required to officially acknowledge its acceptance of its terms for cease-
fire to enter into effect.  This it did on 6 April 1991.  In other words, Iraq
chose to accept the conditions contained therein rather than the consequences
of not signing up.  Furthermore, as a cease-fire arrangement, if Iraq were
subsequently found to be in material breach of the terms, a legal case could
be made that the situation post ante would prevail again.  Therefore, it was
reasonable to assume that Iraq, however reluctantly and even if it argued that
it had accepted the terms under duress, would abide by its obligations under
that resolution. . .
“The UNSCOM process was initially envisaged as having three phases:
“(1)  Full disclosure by Iraq, through written declaration, of all aspects of its
past programmes to acquire the weapons banned to it under the terms of the
cease-fire and its holdings of such weapons, backed up with the verification
of these declarations by means of open-sources, immediate on-site
inspections, and information provided to UNSCOM by Member States;
“(2)  UNSCOM, together with the IAEA in the nuclear area, would supervise
and verify the destruction of Iraq’s current holdings of weapons, ancillary
systems, and facilities for their production, testing, and repair;  and
“(3)  Establishment of twin regimes to monitor Iraq’s imports and exports on
the one hand, and its indigenous dual-capable civilian industry on the other,
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in order to ensure that Iraq did not reacquire the banned weapons systems and
means for their production. . .
“While, as noted above, Iraq formally accepted in writing the terms of the
cease-fire resolution, it has never acknowledged its obligations under
Resolution 707 and 715 (1991).  Indeed, it has gone so far as to call them
‘arbitrary,’ ‘illegal,’ and such as to ‘undermine the U.N. Charter.’  Recently,
Iraq has said that it will never accept Resolutions 707 and 715.
“This issue is crucial to the fulfillment of UNSCOM’s mandate.  Without the
full declarations demanded in Resolution 707, UNSCOM can never make a
determination that it has found all Iraq’s banned weapons capabilities. 
Without Iraq’s acknowledgement of the terms approved by Resolution 715
for long-term monitoring of its obligation not to reacquire the banned
weapons capabilities, UNSCOM cannot be sure under what terms monitoring
would proceed once sanctions and the oil embargo were lifted. 
Consequently, if Iraq maintains its current position, UNSCOM will not be
able to determine that it has identified all banned weapons capabilities, that
it has destroyed them, and that it is effectively monitoring the long-term
situation. . .
“Each time Iraq was found to have lied or concealed items, or sought to
obstruct UNSCOM in its work or to limit its rights, questions were raised
about the motives for such actions and Iraq’s long-term intentions, with the
consequence that the burden of proof on Iraq increased.  The longer Iraq fails
to cooperate fully and honestly, the more UNSCOM will be forced to resort
to more intrusive methods in order to obtain the information necessary for it
to conclude its task. UNSCOM introduced, at an early stage, U-2 aerial
surveillance and its own helicopters for the transportation of inspection
teams.  It introduced new types of inspections, such as document searches,
and subsequently introduced aerial surveillance from helicopter too. . .
“Future prospects depend on two prime factors:  Iraq’s actions and the
continued solidarity of the Security Council in its determination to see Iraq
comply.  Without the latter, UNSCOM can hope to achieve little more. 
Currently, it has to be assumed that Iraq would seek to reacquire the banned
weapons systems as soon as sanctions are lifted and the inspection regime
discontinued or rendered inefficient.  But, if Iraq cooperated, the process
could move forward very quickly.  Efforts must, therefore, concentrate on
convincing Iraq that it is in their own best interest to cooperate.  For this to
happen, Iraq must be made to believe that the determination of the Council
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is unmovable and that sanctions will not be lifted until Iraq is in compliance.
 Conversely, Iraq must also have the incentive that, if it meets the Council’s
demands, sanctions will be lifted.”78
With the latest disclosures on the Iraqi BW program in August 1995,  so drastically different
from all that preceded them, it is possible that a major break in the situation has been
achieved; but as indicated, their completeness remains to be verified.  All the remaining
inadequacies highlighted in the December 1995, UNSCOM report temper any optimism. 
UNSCOM did not begin its work until five months after the Gulf War ended, and its efforts
in the BW area were particularly delayed after that.  Additionally, it did not interrogate Iraqi
officials who held the greatest amount of information.  Those handicaps have now been
remedied, but after a delay of over four years.  The most recent UNSCOM report, released
on April 11, 1996, adds little new information on Iraq’s BW program, but states that “ The
Commission still believes that Iraq has not yet given a full and correct account of its
proscribed activities. . . .”79
CHINA
The United States arms control compliance reports of 1993 and 1994 stated: “the
United States believes that it is highly probable that China has not eliminated its BW
program since becoming a State Party to the Convention in 1984.”80  The same passage had
been deleted by presidential assistants in 1991 and 1992  from both classified and
unclassified versions of the report for reasons that are disputed.  Chinese officials denied the
charge when questioned by Bush administration officials.  The 1995 compliance report was
only slightly more expansive:
“The United States believes that China had an offensive BW program prior
to 1984 when it became a party to the BWC. . . . The United States
government believes that based on available evidence, China maintained an
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79 “Note by the Secretary-General,” U.N. S/1996/April 11, 1996, p. 21.
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offensive BW program throughout most of the 1980s.  The offensive BW
program included the development, production, stockpiling, or other
acquisition or maintenance of biological warfare agents.  China’s CBM
mandated declarations have not resolved concerns about this program and
there are strong indications that China probably maintains its offensive
program.  The United States government, therefore, believes that in the years
after its accession to the BWC, China was not in compliance with its BWC
obligations, and that it is highly probable that it remains non-compliant with
these obligations.”81
Further information appeared in a 1993 press report:
 “The U.S. intelligence community is worried that China may have revived
and possibly expanded its offensive germ weapons program, according to
current and former U.S. intelligence officials.
 “The officials said that, if true, the Chinese effort would violate Beijing’s
nine-year-old pledge of adherence to an international treaty barring
development, production, and stockpiling of toxin and biological agents and
the weaponry to deliver them.
“U.S. officials are also concerned that neighboring Taiwan may have
maintained a germ weapons program of its own, which also dates from the
1970s—a circumstance that they say may have encouraged the Chinese to
continue their program.
 “The officials said U.S. concerns about China are partly based on evidence
that China is pursuing biological research at two ostensibly civilian-run
research centers that U.S. officials say are actually controlled by the Chinese
military. 
 “The research centers were known to have engaged previously in production
and storage of biological weapons, the officials said.  They said U.S.
suspicions intensified in 1991 when one of the suspect biological centers was
enlarged.  Suspicions heightened further last spring, after Beijing made what
one U.S. official termed a ‘patently false’ declaration to the United Nations
that it had never made any germ weapons or conducted any work, permitted
under international treaties, to bolster defenses against a biological attack.
 “But under President George Bush, they said, senior White House officials
repeatedly stripped a strong expression of concern about the suspected
Chinese germ weapons program from unclassified versions of an annual
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report on arms proliferation that the intelligence community prepared for
Capitol Hill.
 “Only last month did the intelligence report, which is required by law, state
for the first time in an unclassified passage that ‘it is highly probable that
China has not eliminated its BW program’ since agreeing to do so in 1984.
 Bush approved the little-noticed report on January 19, his final full day in
office, before sending it to the House and Senate committees on foreign
affairs.
 “The White House deleted this conclusion about China’s activities—a
conclusion representing a consensus of all relevant U.S. agencies—from both
classified and unclassified versions of the report in 1991 and 1992, the
officials said, causing some intelligence analysts to accuse the White House
privately of political censorship.”82
                                                
82 R. Jeffrey Smith, “China May Have Revived Germ Weapons Program, U.S. Officials Say,” Washington Post,
February 24, 1993. It is possible that the two laboratories are the Institute of Epidemiology and Microbiology
Chauaping in Beijing, and the School of Medicine in Shanghai.  Laboratories at these two sites placed orders
for strain cultures with the CDC in 1988 and 1990.  Although that alone is not evidence of a treaty infraction,
it may serve to identify the institutions.
The operative sentence regarding Taiwan in the 1994 compliance report reads,
 “There is some evidence to indicate that Taiwan may have a program, but the
evidence is not sufficient to determine if Taiwan is engaged in activities
prohibited by the BWC.”
and in the 1995 report,
“The United States believes that Taiwan has been upgrading its
biotechnology capabilities by purchasing sophisticated biotechnology
equipment from the United States, Switzerland, and other countries. . . . The
evidence indicating a BW program is not sufficient to determine if Taiwan
is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC.”
The Russian 1993 proliferation report states that “Taiwan does not have biological weapons.”
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SOUTH AFRICA
A surprising disclosure was made in February 1995:  South Africa had initiated a
biological weapons program in 1985 and had maintained it until quite recently.83  Although
production had reportedly ceased, British and American diplomats were attempting to
persuade South Africa to destroy any remaining materials as well as research records and
documentation.  Allegedly, however, “President Mandela has been unable, despite repeated
requests, to persuade his military to relinquish the blueprint. . . ,”84  “. . . Mandela’s
government is not in full control of South Africa’s biological weapons program, a State
Department official said.”85
The situation has been aggravated by a second factor, the possible diffusion of
technology or process information to a second state:  “U.S. intelligence sources reportedly
tracked Libyan agents trying to gain materials, scientists, or information on the program from
South African arms and military establishments.”86  President Mandela subsequently
acknowledged that South Africans involved in the country’s chemical weapons program,
which had allegedly been closed down in 1993, had gone to Libya, and he added weakly, “we
cannot prevent anybody from visiting Libya and we cannot take away the knowledge that
they have.”87
The South African program reportedly produced toxins used for the assassination of
opponents of apartheid.  However, if weapons were produced, means of assassination would
not have been all the program was intended for.  A spokesman for Deputy President de Klerk
claimed that South Africa had initiated its BW program because Angolan forces had used
chemical and biological agents in combat against South Africa.88  The claim is a canard, but
no correction was ever made by South African officials.  There are no known allegations of
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Angolan use of BW, and in the alleged instance of CW use, U.S. intelligence assessments
concluded that chemical weapons had not been used. 
A series of reports in the South African press between December 1994, and March
1995, contain additional information, but these are difficult to interpret for several reasons.
 Nearly all of the statements refer to chemical and biological weapons together, and in some
cases, it is difficult or impossible to discern which ones in fact apply to biological as well as
to chemical.  In addition, some of the statements are highly suspect, while others are
contradictory.  Nevertheless, important information is made available, some of  which 
follows:89
! The surgeon general of the South African National Defence Forces was the official
in charge of both the chemical and biological weapons development programs, and
the program may have been started “in the late 1970s.”
! The Seventh Medical Battalion of the South African military forces seems to have
 been the locus of the research, development, and production efforts.  Individuals
who retired from its service set up a series of interlocking commercial enterprises that
appear to have done much of the work on contract.
! South Africa could “produce and use biological weapons, and learned how to use
BW ‘offensively,’“ but according to General Knoedel, the Surgeon General, the 
program was entirely “defensive.”  (On one occasion, General Knoedel lauded the
high quality of the program.  On another, he claimed it was all a strategic deception:
 South Africa had wanted to fool the superpowers into thinking that it had an
offensive BW capability.)
! The program was allegedly terminated in January 1993, and all the BW agents 
allegedly destroyed in 1993.  However, General Knoedel claimed that President 
Mandela had approved not destroying the R&D records.
! The possibility was raised that Israel and South Africa had collaborated in some 
of the research.
As of the end of 1995, no further information had become available regarding the
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South African program, such as the agents it had worked with, the degree of weaponization,
or the number of researchers it employed.90  The National Institute for Virology in
Johannesburg, and the South African Institute for Medical Research have highly qualified
virology facilities, but—as far as is presently known—BW R&D work appears not to have
been carried out at these laboratories.
It is important to note that the unclassified versions of the annual U.S. arms control
treaty compliance reports never referred to South Africa.  This raises several questions:  Did
the classified versions contain such information, or was information on the BW programs of
nations such as South Africa (and possibly Israel) omitted from the classified versions as
well? These became plausible questions based on the following: the combination of the
disclosure of the South African program, its absence from the compliance reports—in 1995
as well—combined with the disclosure that also reference to China was omitted in 1991 and
1992 even from the classified compliance reports due to an administrative decision by the
Office of the President.
IRAN
The 1994 U.S. compliance report states that “The United States judges that Iran
probably has produced biological warfare agents, and statements by Iranian officials suggest
that it has weaponized a small quantity of those agents.”91  The 1995 report was slightly more
expansive:
“The Iranian BW program has been embedded within Iran’s extensive
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries so as to obscure its activities.
 The Iranian military has used medical, education, and scientific research
organizations for many aspects of BW procurement, research, and production.
 Iran has also failed to submit the data declarations called for in the CBMs.
. .  Iran probably has produced biological warfare agents and apparently has
weaponized a small quantity of those agents.”92
                                                
90 The South African Embassy in Washington and the Institute for Defense Policy in Johannesburg have not
responded to repeated requests to provide further information regarding the former BW program.
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Notably, reference to “production” is made twice.  A U.S. Department of Defense report of
April 1996 added the following:
“Iran began its biological warfare program in the early 1980s during the Iran-
Iraq war.  It made agreements with numerous countries for cooperative
research, scientific exchanges, and technology sharing.  The Iranians are
conducting research on toxins and organisms with biological warfare
applications. . . . Iran has evolved from piecemeal acquisition of
bioprocessing equipment and is now pursuing complete biological production
plants that could be converted to producing biological warfare agents.  Some
of its major universities and research organizations may be linked to its
biological warfare program.”93
The city of Damghan has been identified as the location of a possible “chemical and
biological production facility.”94
In replying to a series of questions in 1993 from the U.S. Senate Committee on
Government Affairs, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency stated that “Iran and Iraq have
missiles and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads. . . but we
believe these countries only have chemical and biological warheads.”95  Iran has reportedly
been able to buy a BW delivery system from a Russian company headquartered in Moscow.
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (F.I.S.) report was, on the other hand, decidedly
equivocal, stating that “Iran does not have offensive biological weapons at this time.  But
it is possible to say with confidence that there is a military-applied biological program.”96
 In 1988 and 1989 Iran attempted to procure both fusarium and mycotoxin-producing
fungi from Canada and the Netherlands for a laboratory at the Iman Reza Medical Center,
Meshed Medical Science University, which also does research on chemical weapons
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agents.97  A number of Iranian microbiologists have worked in the Cuban National Center
for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology in Havana.
NORTH KOREA (DPRK)
The unclassified versions of the arms control treaty compliance reports released by
the United States government do not mention North Korea in regard to BW.98  In response
to a specific question from a senator in 1993, the CIA stated this:
“We have almost no information on whether Pyongyang seeks to build
biological weapons.  Nevertheless, North Korea—if it desires—has the
capability to develop classic biological agents such as anthrax, plague, or
yellow fever.”99
A U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency report on North Korean military capabilities published
in 1991 implied that North Korea was not working on BW.100  The South Korean Defense
White Paper of 1993-1994 says only, “Since the early 1960s North Korea has been pushing
forward with research and development as well as acquisition of biological and chemical
weapons and protection and detection equipment in preparation for biological and chemical
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Efforts since 1992 to obtain declassification of DIA and CIA documentation regarding North Korea
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warfare.”101  Although providing further details about North Korean chemical weapons and
production, it contains not another word about biological weapons.  The Russian Foreign
Intelligence report is substantially more suggestive:
“. . . North Korea is performing applied military-biological research at a
whole series of universities, medical institutes, and specialized research
institutes.  Work is being performed at these research centers with pathogens
for malignant anthrax, cholera, bubonic plague, and small pox.  Biological
weapons are being tested on the island territories belonging to the DPRK.  No
information indicating that these programs are offensive in nature has been
received.”102
The final sentences are contradictory: The testing of biological weapons is by definition
“offensive,” and in violation of the BWC.  In 1996, a U.S. Department of Defense report
stated the following:
“At the direction of President Kim Il-Song, North Korea began to emphasize
an offensive biological warfare program during the early 1960s.  With the
scientists and facilities for producing biological products and micro-
organisms, North Korea probably has the ability to produce limited quantities
of traditional infectious biological warfare agents or toxins and biological
weapons.”103
One author, with information apparently derived from a combination of Korean
Central Intelligence Agency and U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency sources, has claimed that
North Korea has a dedicated BW program.  This author, Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., who has
identified institutions allegedly participating in that program, states that North Korea is
producing biological munitions and, additionally, that it is aiding other countries “with the
technology and assistance required to develop, produce, and offensively employ chemical
and biological weapons,” alleging such cooperation for BW in particular between the DPRK
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and Syria.104  There is no other corroboration for these allegations. 
 “Reports suggest that there are two laboratories and four research facilities
engaged in this research.  Included within these are the Institute of
Microbiological Diseases at the Academy of Medical Science, the Medical
Research Institute at the Academy of National Defense Sciences, and a
facility known only as the ‘No. 25 Factory.’  Some advanced genetic research
is currently occurring within Kim Il-Song University.  Whether this is
connected to the DPRK’s BW program is presently unknown.”
 “It has not been determined when the DPRK actually initiated the production
of biological agents for offensive employment.  Such a capability currently
exists and is believed to have existed at least since the early 1980s, possibly
earlier.  Limited production of biological agents may be conducted at research
facilities but it is possible that separate production facilities exist.”
In 1994, a South Korean publication carried information—allegedly supplied by a North
Korean defector—that identified five organizations, in addition to a “Chemical-Biological-
Radiological Research Center” associated with the North Korean armed forces:
“North Korea’s bacteriological-weapons-related organizations include Kim
Il-son University, Pyongyang Medical College, Pyongyang Military Medical
College, the Institute of Microbiological Diseases under the Pyongyang
Academy of Science, the Bacterium Research Institute under the Second
                                                
104 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Chemical and Biological Warfare Arsenal,” Jane’s Intelligence
Review, May 1993, pp. 225-228.
In a 1989 manuscript (“Korean People’s Army NBC Capabilities,” February 5, 1989), Bermudez had
written the following:
“While the Soviet Union and the PRC have definitely provided the DPRK with chemical agents, they are not
believed to have provided any direct assistance in the development of biological weapons.  Such capabilities
are believed to have been developed indigenously.  DPRK biological warfare research is believed to have begun
sometime during the mid-1960s and to have focused on 10 different strains of bacteria including:  anthrax,
cholera, bubonic plague, smallpox, and yellow fever.  At present, it is believed that the DPRK has not employed
genetic engineering or advanced bio-technology to develop these bacteria.  The primary facilities engaged in
this research are the ‘National Defense Research Institute’ and the ‘Medical Academy.’  However, the exact
location of these facilities is presently unknown.  It is not known whether the DPRK actually initiated the
production of biological agents for offensive employment.  However, such a capability presently exists and is
believed to have existed since at least the early 1980s and possibly earlier.  Limited production of biological
agents may be conducted at the ‘National Defense Research Institute’ and the ‘Medical Academy,’ however,
it is more probable that there exists separate production and research facilities.”
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Academy of Natural Sciences.”105
ISRAEL
As long ago as 1974, U.S. military officials testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee that they had been informed by Israeli counterparts that Israel had an
offensive chemical capability.106  In response to a question by Senator Nunn, General
Almquist replied that he did not know about a biological capability.  It became known in
1993 that the USSR had recruited the former deputy director of the Israeli BW R&D
program, Dr. Markus Klingberg, as a spy.107  Arrested by Israeli authorities in 1983,
Klingberg had worked at Ner Ziona, “a top secret institute near Tel Aviv that does research
in chemical and biological warfare.”108  Notably, Israel has never been listed by the United
States as maintaining a BW R&D program, nor is it referred to at all in the unclassified
versions of the annual arms control treaty compliance reports.  The Russian F.I.S. report
released in 1993 stated in regard to Israel:  “There is no direct evidence of the presence of
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biological weapons in Israel.”109
                                                
109 Proliferation Issues:  Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Report;  in JPRS-TND-93-007, March 5, 1993,
p. 24.
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Russia  Ambiguity regarding continuation of offensive program
1:  “Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, USN, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower,
Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence
Issues,” March 14, 1990, p. 54;  “Statement of Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, USN, Director of Naval
Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services
Committee on Intelligence Issues,” March 1, 1988, p. 48; “Statement of Admiral C.A.H. Trost, USN, Chief of
Naval Operations, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture and Fiscal Year 1991 Budget
of the United States Navy,” February 28, 1990; “Remarks Prepared for Delivery by the Honorable Dick
Cheney, Secretary of Defense, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C., June 11, 1990,”
News Release, No. 294-90, p. 4.
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2: The South African claims that its program was disbanded in 1992. Official UK government statements refer
only to “around 10” nations with “or seeking” BW, but do not name any countries aside from the separate
identification of South Africa in 1995. Israel and Cuba are two other countries regarding which suspicions have
been raised as to whether their BW R&D programs are solely defensive.
3:  Proliferation Issues:  A New Challenge After the Cold War, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Report, (translation), JPRS-TND-93-007, March 5, 1993.
4: In 1994, a Congressional Research Service report (J. M. Collins et al, Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
Weapon Proliferation:  Potential Military Countermeasures, Congressional Research Service, 1994-528S, July
5, 1994, p. 2.) included a table of nations either possessing or having “programs” of weapons of mass
destruction.  For biological weapons it listed Russia as the only nation with “possession confirmed,” Iraq as
“clear intent” (which, by 1994, should also have been in the “confirmed” column), China, India, Pakistan, North
Korea, Taiwan, Iran and Syria as “probable possession” and Egypt and Libya as “suspected programs.”  The
interesting—or anomalous—listings are of India and Pakistan, which have not otherwise been included in any
unclassified official U.S. listings.
[Other versions of this table, essentially based on the sources in Footnote 1 (page 49), were published by Elisa
Harris (1991), Nicole Ball and Robert McNamara (1990), and Steve Fetter (1991), the Office of Technology
Assessment, U.S. Congress, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, (1993), p. 82, and Ivo Daalder
(1994).]
Of those countries that developed BW after World War II to the stage of weapons acquisition, virtually
all either acquired all three categories of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, and biological), or
at least two, and have made attempts at a third:
-  The United States, USSR, France, the UK, China, and South Africa procured all three;
-  Iraq had chemical and biological and was in advanced development of nuclear;
-  Israel has nuclear and chemical;  biological is unknown;
-  Iran has chemical and biological;  seeks nuclear;
-  Libya, has chemical;  has sought nuclear for decades, and is seeking biological;
-  Syria has chemical and biological;
-  North Korea has chemical;  sought nuclear, and accepting the Russian assessment,
apparently has biological;
-  India and Pakistan have nuclear;  chemical and biological are unknown;
- Taiwan has chemical, South Korean chemical is ambiguous, and both had incipient nuclear programs
in the late 1970s.
According to a statement by former CIA Director Woolsey in 1994, nations developing and procuring
BW have usually done so following their procurement of CW, and it has frequently been stated that various
Arab states in the Middle East developed chemical weapons because of Israel’s possession of nuclear weapons.
 There are no statements or analyses that have extended this rationale specifically to their development of
biological weapons as well, although it is an easy, logical extension to make.  Note Anthony Cordesman’s
phrase, “Nations that are interested in biological weapons are already interested because they offer an
alternative to nuclear weapons. . . .”  It would not be altogether surprising if one learned that some governmental
policy group in these states that had considered or was urging the acquisition of nuclear weapons had spun off
the suggestion to develop biological weapons.  Nevertheless, nothing is publicly known regarding the policy
decisions in these states regarding BW development.
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The Potential Use of BW by Extra-National, or “Terrorist,” Groups.
There have been many warnings over a period of several decades of the possible use
of biological weapons by terrorist groups.  The reason given is the ostensible ease of
preparation of such agents.  Nevertheless, to date, this has not taken place.  The most serious
attempt to produce an agent, which nevertheless failed, was made by the Japanese Aum
Shinrikyo group in the early 1990s.  The same group did go on to manufacture and use the
chemical agent Sarin in Tokyo in 1994, and then again in March 1995.  Also there is also a
record of threats by several groups or individuals to use BW, and some indication of the
nature of these can be given.
The first thorough review of this subject, a substantial monograph titled Chemical
and Biological Terrorism, became available in June 1995.110  The author divided his
examination into five parts:
(1)  Threats to use BW, without any evidence of actual capabilities;
(2)  Unsuccessful attempts to acquire BW;
(3)  Actual possession of BW agents;
(4)  Attempted unsuccessful use of such agents;
(5)  Their actual “successful use.”
Several events recorded in the past 30 years exemplify developments in this area:
(1)  In the 1960s, Robert Depugh, the owner of a veterinary medical products supply
company named the Biolab Corporation in the state of Missouri, headed the largest
paramilitary right wing organization in the United States, the Minutemen of America.  He
claimed to have “. . . a number of our own physicians and bacteriologists working on the
production of biological agents. . . .Most of this research goes on after hours in public and
private institutions where they hold a regular job during the day and have an opportunity to
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moonlight a few hours in the evening on their own.”  He claimed that his associates were
researching classical BW R&D subject matters, “. . . such as. . . the selective breeding of
various pathogens in order to increase or decrease their virulence and to render them resistant
to antibiotics.”111  He referred to equine encephalitis virus as one of seven agents his group
had selected to work on.  He also claimed that he had personally produced Sarin at his
company’s facilities “and elsewhere across the country.”  None of these claims were ever
validated by any other source, and there is no knowledge that any of the agents implied were
actually ever produced, or were ever used.  It is not known whether any of the claims were
more than bluster and a demonstration of the ability to use the right phraseology.
 (2)  An attempt was made to extort funds from the Brandt government in West
Germany in 1973 by an individual or group threatening to pollute “shopping centers, hotels,
factories, and city water systems with deadly bacteria.”112  Nothing occurred following the
blackmail attempt.
(3)  Sometime between 1980 and 1984 (ostensibly equally expert sources with access
to classified U.S. government records dispute the date) the bathroom of a Paris apartment
was found to contain flasks of clostridium botulinum.  The apartment was a “safe house” of
the West German Red Army Faction, also known as the Baader Meinhoff Group.  Although
the public record does not indicate that the material was produced at that location, the work
is attributed to one of the group’s members, Silke Maier-Witt, who was a medical assistant
by profession.113
(4)  Sometime in the mid-1980s, the Tamil Elaam secessionist groups, waging a war
of secession in Northern Sri Lanka, released a communique threatening to wage biological
warfare against the government.114 The Tamil Elaam was a group that had unquestionably
demonstrated an aggressive willingness to take virtually any action—massacres;
assassination of the Indian head of state (Rajiv Gandhi) as well as that of Sri Lanka and other
senior Sri-Lankan politicians; the use of suicide volunteers—and some facility with using
somewhat advanced technologies, such as demolition frogmen.  The communique that stated
their intentions sounded as if they knew what they were doing.  They described four
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operations that they could carry out.  Two of these targeted the human population:  the
transport and introduction of the natural vectors for River Blindness (a snail) and Yellow
Fever (mosquitoes) into the south of the country.  The remaining two were threats of
transporting and introducing two anti-plant agents, against the rubber trees and tea bushes
that make up two of Sri Lanka’s major export products.   Nevertheless there is no evidence
of their having carried out any of the four BW operations.   [After the March 1995 events in
Tokyo,  the Tamil Elaam also threatened to use Sarin in attacking government (military)
facilities.]
(5)  In March 1995, two members of an American right wing militia, “the Minnesota
Patriots Council, were convicted of conspiracy charges for planning to use a lethal biological
toxin, ricin, to kill Federal employees and law enforcement agents.”115  The conspirators 
were apprehended before any actual use occurred.
 (6)  In 1995, a member of an American right wing racist group (Aryan Nation) who
was a qualified microbiologist who maintained a small laboratory in his basement, ordered
samples of bubonic plague from the American Type Culture Collection because “he needed
the bacteria to conduct ‘biomedical research using rats to counteract imminent invasion from
Iraq of super-germ carrying rats,’“ or, alternatively, “because he (was) writing a research
book,”116  The individual was arrested, and the cultures, as well as explosives, were
recovered.
(7)  On March 20, 1995, members of a Japanese religious sect, the Aum Shinrikyo
(Supreme Truth) released Sarin gas in a carefully prepared attack in the Tokyo subway
system.  Fortunately, mortality was  quite low.  The same group had also intentionally
released Sarin a year before, with several deaths resulting, but had not been apprehended.
 Following the 1995 attack, Japanese police began a months-long process of searching the
extensive facilities owned by the sect—over a hundred individual buildings and sites—
something which had not been done previously.  In addition to hundreds of tons of
intermediate chemicals that had been stockpiled for the production of chemical weapons,
police discovered that the sect had been attempting for several years to prepare botulinum
toxin for use as an aerosol weapon.  At the site of the group’s CW production facility, “160
barrels of peptone” media were found in one of the buildings in the village of Kamikuishiki.
117  The group had procured four fermenters, a vacuum dryer, and a milling machine, and had
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tested their product on guinea pigs.  However, in several years of efforts the Aum Shinrikyo
had failed to produce botulinum toxin.118
There are two significant aspects of the Aum Shinrikyo attempt.  The first is that it
failed, although it appears to have been the most serious attempt on record,  with no lack of
resources and time.  The second is that the perpetrating group was most certainly not an
ordinary “terrorist” group.  It would be useful, therefore, to look at both the characteristics
of the group and the resources that it applied to produce a BW agent:
! It was a religious sect.
! Its teachings were apocalyptic.
! Its devotees were exposed to classical aspects of the more severe forms of   indoctrination and 
! It had abducted and killed civilians that it considered “enemies.”
! The leadership of the group, at least at one time, had political ambitions;  some 25
of its members had run for seats in Japan’s parliament only a few years before.
! The group was administered as a miniature government, with “ministers” and
sectorial responsibilities.  Its leader “apparently envisioned a ‘sovereign state’ with its
own government and the ability to wage war with guns, bacteria, or nerve gas.”119
! Aum Shinrikyo had a most extravagant access to financial resources, estimated as
being between 1.2 and 1.6 billion dollars.
! It maintained several front companies for procuring advanced Western production
equipment and extremely large stocks of chemical intermediates.
! It had also recruited a small staff of qualified scientists, (“around thirty. . .”), some
of them at the post-doctoral level and with experience in industrial and medical R&D.
 These people supervised about 100 laboratory technicians.  These scientists, with the
combination of funds, Western equipment, and industrial intermediaries, had succeeded
in producing Sarin.
As stated earlier, despite continual apprehensiveness on the part of experts over the
decades, there have been no instances of BW use by terrorists.  This has frequently prompted
the question of “why not?” 
It seems very likely that experts and analysts have been much too “optimistic,” and that
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BW is not easy for an untrained group to produce.  In addition, other actions may be very
much easier to do and the materials to carry them out acquired, or more readily provided, by
patron states.  Sophisticated plastic explosives were available by the ton; digital timing
devices are purchasable legally.  In some instances, the relative discreetness of effect of an
explosive may be what the terrorist group desires.  However, if an explosive device is placed
in a marketplace or a bus station, it is difficult to imagine that the terrorist group would not
be quite satisfied—in fact, would consider it desirable—if it could kill 10 or 100 times as
many people in the same act.  To produce BW, one does need appropriate knowledge and
experience, as well as a laboratory and equipment; the failure of the Japanese Aum group
after several years of effort in this respect would indicate exactly that.
Except for the Aum case—in which the effort to produce a BW agent did not succeed—
no evidence has appeared over the decades indicating whether BW was considered by
terrorist groups: if so, why it was rejected;  if not, why it was not.  For example, in the case
of the quite specific Tamil Elam threat described above, it is not known if the threat was only
a bluff, or if there ever was any serious intention and effort to carry it out at any point.
It is frequently argued that the acts of terrorist groups are intended to gain the sympathy
of the public for their cause, and that the use of BW would presumably be counterproductive
from that viewpoint.  However, historical experience undercuts that basic premise.  It is clear
that terrorist groups do not mind killing people, including innocent civilians in sizable
numbers.  The sabotage of aircraft (Lockerbie, French airliners over Africa) and bombings
(from marketplaces, taverns and department stores, to Oklahoma City and the World Trade
Center, the latter carrying the potential of deaths in the thousands) make that clear.  They also
don’t hesitate to assassinate heads of state or other major political figures (Indira and Rajiv
Gandhi, Lord Mountbatten, Aldo Moro, attempted assassination of Prime Minister Thatcher,
etc.), which earns them no sympathy at all, not even in the eyes of a selected or targeted
population to whom the act might be assumed to appeal.  They have their own cost-benefit
analyses regarding the desirability of particular acts they carry out, and the assumed
consideration that they would not do something that would alienate the general public and
cost them its sympathy is not substantiated.  (Although not a traditional “terrorist” group, the
use of CW by the Japanese Aum group would certainly bear this out.)  In addition, the aim
of some terrorist groups is not to gain adherents or earn public sympathy, but simply to
disrupt society, and, in some cases, even to topple the national government.
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Biological Weapons Arms Control since 1975
The Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) entered into force in 1975
and currently has over 130 States Parties.120  The BTWC prohibits the development,
production, and stockpiling of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins, of types and
in quantities that have no justification or prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes,
and weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for
hostile purposes or in armed conflict.  The BWC was also of unlimited duration, and
additionally provided that if a majority of the parties to it agreed, review conferences could
be held every five years.  These majorities were obtained, and a review conference has been
held every five years since the BWC came into force in 1975.
There were, however, two major drawbacks to the Convention.  First, there was no
prohibition on research;  all research was permissible.  Therefore the development and
production of “quantities” that could be justified for “protective,” or defensive research, were
permitted.  There was no mention of “offensive” or “defensive” research—”research” was
not mentioned at all—and hence no discussion of a distinction between the two, if any, could
be drawn.  There was, in addition, no definition of the boundary between research and
“development,” which is prohibited.  For example, the parameters of the “quantities” were
not delineated. 
Second, there were no provisions for verification of any sort.  In 1972, the former USSR
was totally opposed to any consideration of on-site verification.  In more recent years, once
verification could be considered, the first set of problems would pose the greatest difficulty:
 distinguishing between legitimate “protective” or “defensive” biological research programs
and those intended for offensive use.
Following the anthrax accident at a military BW facility in the USSR at Sverdlovsk in
1979, the United States attempted to make use of the consultation provisions under Article
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5 of the BWC.  The U.S. diplomatic effort was criticized for not having been handled well,
but it is inconceivable that the former USSR would have provided valid information under
any circumstances, given the nature of the accident and what it would have disclosed.  In
1984, the United States declared the USSR in violation of the BWC but did not lodge a
complaint with the U. N. Security Council, as it was entitled to do under Article 6 of the
BWC, a procedure that could also have been followed in 1979.  A Soviet veto of any such
U.S. initiative in the Security Council would have been likely in 1979 or 1984, but at the
same time it would have impugned Soviet compliance.
The Second Review Conference took place in 1986, following the transition to the
Gorbachev administration in the former USSR.  There were two important outcomes.  First
the conference decided on four “confidence-building measures” (CBMs).121  These were to
be “politically binding,” but not mandatory, as described below:
 (1) The declaration of all high containment facilities and of defense facilities: 
exchange data on high-security containment facilities (all BL-4 laboratories, and BL-3
ones at defense facilities), including providing data on their work programs.
(2)  The declaration of unusual outbreaks of disease:  exchange information on unusual
outbreaks of diseases (unusual in terms of the detection of a new, possibly unique
disease, and/or a disease at a location where it has never before been observed). 
(3) The encouragement of the publication of the results of research:  encourage the open
publication of results from bacteriological and biological research. 
(4) The encouragement of international contacts between scientists:  actively promote
international contacts between biological researchers, including promotion of joint
projects between them directly related to the BWC. 
In addition, to resolve the type of situation brought about by the unresolved allegations of the
United States against the former USSR, and to establish a procedure for investigating and
evaluating, in general, allegations of non-compliance in a less politicized and confrontational
setting than the U.N. Security Council, it was decided that, under Article 5, a consultative
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meeting would be promptly convened at the request of any signatory nation that asked for
one in order to consider a specific presumptive violation.  The Final Declaration of the
Second Review Conference “. . .stresses the need for all States to deal seriously with
compliance issues and emphasizes that the failure to do so undermines the convention and
the arms control process in general.”  In April 1987, an ad hoc meeting of experts met and
established the procedures for the information exchanges.122  The first exchange was to be
completed by October 15, 1987.  Subsequently, submissions were to be provided each year.
 The Third Review Conference, to take place in 1991, would decide whether to make any
changes in the procedure.
When the Third BWC Conference was convened in September 1991, there had been
several significant intervening developments:
! The Gulf War had just ended, and in it there had been the possibility of use of both
biological and chemical weapons by Iraq.  Moreover, Iraq had been a signatory of the
BWC.
! For the above reason, as well as for others, there was greater interest in BW prolif-
eration.
! The former USSR was being extremely cooperative in strategic arms control
negotiations, and for the first time, provisions for on-site inspection had been written
into the Stockholm CBMs in 1986 and into the INF Treaty by the end of 1987.
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All of these factors combined to produce a significant interest in stronger verification
provisions in the BWC on the part of a substantial number of the State Parties attending the
Review Conference in 1991.  Seeing both the obvious need for strengthening and the
opportunity provided by the changed international political circumstances, there had been a
good deal of thinking and preparation both by governments and NGOs in advance of the
Review Conference.123
The Third Review Conference first reaffirmed the four CBMs established in 1986.  It
then added three more:  the declaration of national legislation related to the BTWC;  the
declaration of past activities in offensive/defensive biological research and development
programs;  and the declaration of human vaccine production facilities.124  But as the head of
the U.S. delegation to the Review Conference explained,
“The issue of verification became the single most contentious question at the 1991
BWC Review Conference.  The majority of States Parties argued that they should
incorporate verification measures into the BWC even if those measures were not
completely effective since such measures would contribute to deterring BW
proliferation.  The United States, however, argued that the BWC was not verifiable
and it had not identified a way to make it so.  In simplistic terms the argument was
between those who contended that ‘some verification was better than none’ and the
United States argued that ‘bad verification was worse than none.’“125
The irony was very great.  The United States had always been the major proponent of
verification procedures in U.S.-USSR arms control negotiations since the late 1950s.  The
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succeeding U.S. ambassador to the conferences that followed explained the position of the
Bush administration in greater detail.  While noting that “Adequate and effective verification
is an essential element of all arms limitation and disarmament agreements,” he continued,
“Many governments, especially in the West. . . wanted to amend the BWC by
adding more restrictive, intrusive measures. . . the United States delegation
opposed these measures.  However, the United States did agree to formation of a
working group of experts whose mission is to evaluate any verification measures
proposed by States Parties from a scientific and technical standpoint.
 “Verification measures are included as part of an arms control agreement to
enhance the national capability of parties to monitor compliance and to detect
violations in a timely fashion.  In addition, verification measures are included to
deter violations of an arms control agreement.  Of course, judgments about
compliance are a national prerogative, and each party must rely on the information
it has available to assess the compliance of the other parties.
 “The United States draws a clear distinction between confidence-building and
verification.  Confidence-building measures provide participants with access to
information that encourages a climate of openness and transparency.  They also
allow participants to demonstrate how their activities should not be considered
threatening to others.”
 “Effective verification measures, singly or in combination, should:
- Provide confidence that the States Parties are in compliance with treaty
provisions;
- Deter violation of treaty provisions by significantly increasing the risk of
detection and thereby raising the costs of cheating;
- Enable the States Parties, individually or collectively, to detect a violation in a
timely fashion before it poses a military risk and/or places a State Party in a
position where it is too late or too difficult to take countermeasures.
 “Given this understanding of verification, our own analyses indicate that the BWC
cannot be made more effective by adding verification measures known to us.  The
small size and complex structure of microorganisms, and the dual-purpose nature
of many items used in biological production, make verification of a ban on
biological weapons problematic, to say the least.  Our concerns about the
verifiability of the BWC are the primary reason the United States opposed the
proposals for specific verification regimes made at the September 1991 review
conference.  But it should also be noted that the United States opposes any measure
that would limit our ability to pursue a biological defense program or unduly
burden American industry.”126
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Ambassador Lacey reiterated that “It is. . . our view that any proposed regime must not have
an unacceptable impact on United States industry. . . CBMs should not pose an undue burden
on . . . workers or harm the competitiveness of U.S. companies.”
A “verification protocol” had actually been proposed at the Review Conference and was
supported among others by Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Germany and Russia.127  All—
including Russia—favored some sort of on-site or challenge inspections, and made specific
proposals regarding various degrees of frequency and intrusiveness.  All explicitly
understood that an inspection regime would not produce absolute certainty of the absence of
violation, but all felt that it was impossible to conceive of circumstances in which less
information could be better than having more information.  In the mid-1980s with no
verification possible, the Reagan administration, in addition to having provided for a 500-
plus percent increase in funding for BW research in six years, felt that the utility of the Treaty
was limited and placed little emphasis on it.128  In 1991-1992, with on-site verification
conceivable—albeit unquestionably difficult—the Bush administration decided in advance
that it could not work, that it could not produce a level of absolute confidence, and therefore
opposed it entirely.  It is not even clear if this was the primary policy determinant, or if the
other two stated concerns—the protection of proprietary information of U.S. commercial
biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms, and the safeguarding of U.S. defensive research
from formal international monitoring—were the driving policy determinants, or if the
administration had seriously attempted to draw a balance between them.  Whether a
verification protocol was achievable in 1991-1992 on a par with the Chemical Weapons
Convention is unknown, but the U.S. opposition was essentially responsible for the stretched
out process that began in 1992 and will extend through 1996.  Ironically, just halfway
through that period, the U.S. government’s position changed entirely, and favored what it had
opposed in 1991-1992.
The U.S. opposition resulted in the creation of an Ad Hoc Group of Governmental
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Experts which subsequently came to be known as the VEREX exercise, with membership
drawn from States Parties to the BWC.  It was charged with adopting a consensus report on
additional verification measures before the end of 1993, which would then be considered by
BWC members.  The charge to the expert group was to do the following:
“. . . identify measures which would determine whether a State Party is developing,
producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining microbial or other biological agents
or toxins, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective or peaceful purposes;  and whether a State Party is developing,
producing, stockpiling, acquiring or retaining weapons, equipment or means of
delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed
conflict.” 
To do this, they were directed to use the following criteria to guide the examination of
potential verification measures:
(1) Their strengths and weaknesses based on, but not limited to, the amount and quality
of information they provide, and fail to provide;
(2) Their ability to differentiate between prohibited and permitted activities;
(3) Their ability to resolve ambiguities about compliance;
(4) Their technology, material, manpower and equipment requirements;
(5) Their financial, legal, safety and organizational implications;
(6) Their impact on scientific research, scientific cooperation, industrial development
and other permitted activities; and their implications for the confidentiality of
commercial proprietary information.
The measures could be examined singly or in combination.  When the experts had completed
their work and their report had been circulated to BWC States Parties, if a majority of them
requested a Special Conference to consider it and to decide on what to do next, that would
take place.  There had never been a Special Conference held under the Treaty before, but it
would obviate having to wait for the next Review Conference, which was not scheduled until
1996, to decide on further steps.
The U.S. administration’s guidance to the U.S. delegation to the first VEREX meeting
in March-April 1992 was described in a report by the U.S. Government Accounting Office:
“The U.S. strategy for the first meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental
Experts called for the U.S. delegation to be open to constructive suggestions, but
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to oppose any ineffective verification provision and any measures that would limit
the U.S. government’s ability to pursue its biological defense programs and impair
the U.S. biotechnology industry’s competitive edge now held in the world.  The
U.S. delegation was to explain to the other delegations the nature, diversity, and
complexity of biological research, including its dual-use nature, the small size of
some equipment, and its widespread existence.  Furthermore, the delegation was
to explain that because of legitimate commercial and defense activities requiring
biological items, evidence of an offensive BW program is therefore not easily
identifiable.  The United States did not make any verification proposal during the
meeting.”129
That guidance and U.S. administration policy changed in 1993.
The Ad Hoc Group agreed in 1992 to examine 21 potential verification measures under
the three broad areas of a BW program:  development, acquisition or production, and
stockpiling or retention.  They did this in three subsequent meetings:  the first, to analyze the
technologies that would be associated with proposed measures on the list; the second, to
evaluate proposed measures according to the agreed criteria; and the last, to compile a final
report for BWC members.  The 18-month VEREX exercise would evaluate the 21 measures
singly and in combinations in an attempt to find the best possible combination within the
constraints of the cost to carry them out, coupled with the problems of commercial
industries.130  The final report was to be an analysis which would compare the various
measures, and not a draft verification regime.  The measures were divided into two
categories, off-site and on-site.  Off-site measures included remote sensing and various types
                                                
129 Arms Control:  U.S. and International Efforts to Ban Biological Weapons,  GAO/NSIAD-93-113, 
December 1992, p. 19.
130 As indicated, the first VEREX meeting took place on 3/30/92 to 4/10/92 with 53 participants;  the second
from 11/23/92 to 12/4/92 with 46 participants;  the third from 5/24/93 to 6/4/93 with 42 participants;  and the
fourth and final session on 9/13/93 to 9/24/93 with 41 participants.
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of information monitoring, primarily by a variety of instrumentation.  The 21 potential
verification measures were the following:131
                                                
131 Report, including Final Report, Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts to Identify and Examine Potential
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Measures in combination:
The following five combinations were studied as examples to illustrate the evaluation
of enhanced capabilities and limitations of measures in combination:
      - Declarations/multilateral information sharing/satellite surveillance/visual
inspection
      - Information monitoring (surveillance of publications/surveillance of
legislation/data on transfers, transfer requests and production/multilateral
information-sharing/exchange visits)
      - On-site inspection (interviewing/visual inspections;  identifications of key
equipment/auditing/sampling and identification)
      - Declarations/multilateral information-sharing/on-site visual inspection
      - Declarations/information monitoring
The VEREX final report was not particularly a blaze of enthusiasm.  It noted “. . . that
capabilities and limitations existed for each measure,” and that “. . . reliance could not be
placed on any single measure by itself to determine whether a State Party is developing,
producing, stockpiling, or retaining. . . .”  It noted that the group had “most frequently
identified for application” a group of declarations, as well as the entire subset of on-site
inspections, and concluded,
“Based on the examination and evaluation of the measures described above against
the criteria given in the mandate, the Group considered, from the scientific and
technical standpoint, that some of the potential verification measures would
contribute to strengthening the effectiveness and improve the implementation of
the Convention, also recognizing that appropriate and effective verification could
reinforce the Convention.”132
The required majority of BWC States Parties did request a Special Conference, which
led to another cycle of conferences.  The Special Conference met in September 1994,
received the VEREX report favorably, and established a new Ad Hoc Group that would now
“examine appropriate measures, including verification measures, and draft proposals to be
included, as appropriate, in a legally binding instrument.”  The Ad Hoc Group met three
times in 1995,  with two sessions in 1996, the last to be coordinated with the Fourth Review
Conference of the BWC in September 1996.133
                                                
132 Ibid.
133 The Special Conference took place September 19-30, 1994, with a preceding Preparatory Committee
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During this drawn-out, five-year period of conferences of experts and negotiations, there
was one other intervening event with important arms control significance.  In June 1993, the
Australia Group—a group of nations that in the past had drawn up and agreed to a target list
of items to aid in controlling the export of materials that could lead to the production of
chemical weapons—did the same for biological agents and the manufacturing equipment that
could be used to produce BW.134  The 26 members of the group agreed to follow the same
export restrictions.  Their meeting took place jointly with the European Commission, and
again evolved from an earlier policy decision in 1990 that the group would extend its efforts
from the chemical weapons area to develop export control guidelines in the biological area
as well. Notably, Iran has expended a good deal of diplomatic effort, so far unsuccessfully,
to have the Australia Group abolished.  In 1996 meetings, Iran has demanded that all existing
export control regimes—obviously including the Australia Group—should be abolished once
a verification protocol is agreed to.  Iran’s leverage is provided by the operational principle
of decision by consensus in U.N. deliberations, and that leverage is increased the closer the
great majority of nations comes to agreeing on the desirability, importance, and fundamentals
of a verification protocol.
What has the process of strengthening the BWC by providing additional verification
capability achieved?  At the September 1994 Special Conference, several nations—Iran
above all—wanted to see nothing further take place.  However, by September 1994, the
United States was interested in seeing that a series of “transparency measures” be extended
on an international basis to all States Parties of the BWC.  These measures would be similar
to those that the United States, Russia, and the UK had agreed on in the trilateral process in
September 1992.  That included mandatory data exchanges, or declarations, and mandatory
on-site visits.  Both aspects were essential:  whatever was decided on must be mandatory,
and there had to be some on-site inspection capability.  The United States and all European
                                                                                                                                                
meeting on April 11-15, 1994.  The 1995 Ad Hoc Group meetings were on January 4-6, 1995,  July 10-21,
1995, and November 27- December 8, 1995.  An administrative meeting was held on January 1996, another
brief meeting April 9-12, 1996, and the remaining 1996 meetings will be in July and September.
134 Australia Group Meeting:  Fact Sheet, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, July 28, 1993, 2 pages,
and Australia Group, Export Controls on Materials Used in the Manufacture of Chemical and Biological
Weapons;  Control List of Dual-Use Biological Equipment, List of Biological Agents for Export Control Core
List,  Control List of Plant Pathogens, Control List of Animal Pathogens.  Fact Sheet, U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, October 25, 1993. The list included seven categories of equipment:  (1) BL-3 and BL-4
containment facilities; (2) Fermenters; (3) Centrifugal separators; (4) Cross flow filtration equipment; (5)
Aerosol inhalation chambers; (6) Freeze-drying equipment; (7) Equipment to be included inside BL-3 or BL-4
containment.  Each of these categories of equipment was defined by specific technical parameters.
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states had also hoped that the new Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Conference
would function as a drafting group, to prepare a protocol to the BWC that would be ready in
time for consideration at the Fourth Review Conference in 1996.  It is now apparent that  that
schedule will not be met, as had earlier been anticipated.  The opposition of Iran and two or
three other countries appears to be sufficient to promise an anticipated delay of perhaps two-
to-three additional years.
The purpose of the mandatory declarations would be to provide a database on the
facilities that were of the greatest potential danger to the BWC, the most convertible, and the
easiest to disguise:  all facilities with high containment, all that used listed organisms, and
all national biological defense programs.135  Over a period of years, such declarations would
presumably provide a profile of “a national pattern of activity.”  If that profile changed, it
could provide reason for an on-site visit.  Such visits would have to take place on relatively
short notice, and they would be to any declared or undeclared site, or to a site of alleged use
of BW.  The requirement for  a greater number of declarations and for mandatory ones meant
that the question of an international directorate would have to be resolved.  The most likely
solution would be an addition to, and colocation with, the OPCW, the organization
responsible for verification of the Chemical Weapons Convention (in full, the Provisional
Technical Secretariat of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons).  Finally,
the existing BWC would be left intact so as not to run the risk of loosing any current States
Parties, and in order for a new protocol to be legally binding, it would have to undergo a
separate ratification process.  As there were already signatories to the BWC that had not yet
ratified it, very likely many in that group would not ratify the new protocol, or even sign it.
The July 1995 meeting of the Ad Hoc Group, in fact, divided its work program into four
areas, the first two of which appear to be somewhat redundant and are both an outgrowth of
                                                
135 See the following very useful papers on recent efforts and proposals to strengthen the BWC:  Graham S.
Pearson, “Forging an Effective Biological Weapons Regime,” Arms Control Today, 24:5, June 1994, pp. 14-17;
Graham S. Pearson, “Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Convention:  The Outcome of the Special
Conference,” Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Issue No. 26, December 1994, pp. 1, 3-6;  Jonathan B.
Tucker, “Strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention,” Arms Control Today, 25:3, April 1995, pp. 9-12;
Michael Moodie, September 1994, op. cit.;  Graham S. Pearson, “Improving the Biological Weapons
Convention,” Proceedings of the First Moscow Conference on Chemical and Biological Disarmament,
Demilitarization and Conversion, Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, 1993.  See also brief papers
by Edward Lacey, H. Mash’hadi, and Nikolai Pietkov;  Edward J. Lacey, “Tackling the Biological Weapons
Threat:  The Next Proliferation Challenge,”  Washington Quarterly, 17:4, Autumn 1994, pp. 46-53.  Susan
Wright, “Prospects for Biological Disarmament in the 1990s,” Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems
2:2, Fall 1992, pp. 453-492.
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the VEREX process:
! Measures to promote compliance:  declarations, on-site measures, including short
notice and challenge inspections, etc.;
! Other confidence-building and transparency measures;
! Lists of agents and toxins, definitions, criteria;
! “Article 10 issues.”
The last, under pressure from Iran and several other participants, refers to increasing
technology transfers to developing nation member states.
Problems and Possibilities of Verification
It is crucial to understand the nature of past programs in order to establish a baseline for
subsequent credibility and control. The last six years have provided the experience with the
former USSR/Russia and Iraq in which partial and limited degrees of inspection have not
been sufficient to wholly determine the past or present status of either nation’s BW program.
 Neither nation was willing to disclose the details of their past programs.  As one of the
UNSCOM inspectors commented regarding Iraq, “They only tell us what we find out about;
 if there is a chance to hide anything, deceive something, they do so.  The biological area was
the one most lacking in cooperation, the one that they engaged in with the greatest
reluctance.”  Both nations have been determined to hide their activities, and both were and
are controlled societies to a major degree.  Access to Russian facilities is still limited.
The verification problem is simply the ability to find and then to distinguish prohibited
from permitted activity, to distinguish offensive from defensive research programs.  In BW
this is complicated by the fact that the facilities—at least in theory—need not be very large,
and the equipment is usually dual-purpose.  Nevertheless, all the national facilities identified
to date have been sizable.
What would one look for?  The director of biological research at a French military
laboratory listed the following in 1992 as “indicators of strategic BW development:”
“. . . large scale production of an agent, the existence of certain storage facilities,
the use of certain equipment such as fermenters and freeze drying equipment, and
the safety protection being provided personnel.”136
                                                
136 Government Accounting Office, 1992, op. cit., p. 21.
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When U.S. satellite intelligence photo interpreters in the mid-1970s identified tall incinerator
stacks, large cold storage facilities, animal pens, sentries and double barbed wire fences in
a Soviet military compound in Sverdlovsk, they suspected it of being a BW laboratory—
which it was.  Both groups of characteristics, however, are at the high end of the indicator
spectrum. Of course, the use of fermenters alone would not be indicative;  all would depend
on what was being grown in them.  In addition, more recent technology could reduce the
need for large stockpiles that were previously held in readily recognizable storage facilities,
depending on the procedures that a nation chose to implement.  Raymond Zilinskas wrote
the following:
“. . . verifying that no BW-related work is taking place in a given nation’s P-4 (BL-
4) research laboratories is probably the single best measure indicating that the
nation in question is indeed not involved with BW.”137
However, it appears that Iraq had no BL-4 facility (i.e., laboratories with enhanced security).
 The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service produced a remarkable indicator list in 1993
saying this:
“The development, production, stockpiling, and possible use of biological 
weapons may . . . be identified on the basis of the following specific indications:
- The existence of programs for training troops, special subunits or intelligence and
sabotage groups, for operations involving the use of biological weapons;
- The presence or purposeful search for highly qualified specialists in immunology, 
- biochemistry, bioengineering, and related fields, who have experience in the 
- development of biological weapons and means of protection;
- The building of laboratories with enhanced security [according to international 
- classification P-3 (BL-3) or P-4 (BL-4)];
- The development of secret research programs and secret special and military
- facilities of biomedical orientation;
- Large-scale production of vaccines (against especially dangerous infections) and the
existence of stocks of these vaccines which exceed real peacetime requirements;
- Creation of a production base, specifically of bioreactors and fermenters with a
capacity of more than 50 liters or a total capacity of more than 200 liters;
      -Outbreaks of especially dangerous infectious diseases not typical of specific regions;
      -The purchase of starting biomaterials and equipment for the production of biological weapons, as
                                                
137 Raymond Zilinskas, “Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention,” Chapter 7 in Erhard Geissler
(ed.), Biological and Toxin Weapons Today, SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 85-107.
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- Activity related to microorganisms and toxins which cannot be explained by civilian
requirements, activity involving agents of especially dangerous infections not
endemic to a given area;
      -The existence of biotechnological equipment and conduct of work to create vectors of various d
culturing them;
      -The existence of equipment for microencapsulation of live microorganisms;
- The existence of equipment for studying the behavior of biological aerosols in the
- environment.”138
Not the least interesting aspect of this list is that it would always have served as an
indicator of the former Soviet BW program.  But the list is even more “superindicative” than
the group of items provided by the French official.  It, of course, identifies the maximum of
everything in a large and ambitious national program, even including a potential disease
outbreak due to a BW installation accident, such as actually took place in the former USSR
in 1979.
The former director of USAMRIID, Colonel David Huxsoll, presented a scheme in his
1989 testimony to Congress that attempted to explain the differences between offensive and
defensive research, as well as between the development of vaccines and other defenses and
biological weapons. (See Figure 1 on page 72.)
 “From the outset, defensive research is based on different postulates and
hypotheses than is research directed toward offensive ends, and the rationales for
data collection and analysis are different.
“At the basic research level, the laboratory techniques used would be very similar,
but the objectives are markedly different.  Beyond the basic research level, there
is a marked divergence in the type of work that would be done.
 “If a vaccine were to be produced, one that would pursue ways of crippling,
weaken, or lessening the virulence of the agent in question so that it could be used
in humans without fear of inducing disease[;  i]n fact, it may be completely
inactivated, a killed vaccine.
 “A vaccine would be produced under the stringent guidelines of the Food and
Drug Administration regulations and would have to receive FDA approval before
use.  This type of work is permitted by the Biological Weapons Convention.”
 “If, however, the goal were to create a weapon, the opposite objectives would be
pursued.  Efforts to enhance virulence or toxicity and to produce enormous
quantities of agent far larger than those required for vaccine production would be
undertaken.  In addition, the issues of stability, dissemination, and weapons
                                                
138 “Proliferation Issues: A New Challenge After the Cold War:  Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction,” Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service Report, March 3, 1993, JPRS-TND-93-007, pp.
15-16.
72 / Biological Weapons Arms Control
delivery systems would have to be addressed.  These activities are clearly
prohibited by the Biological Weapons Convention.”139
                                                
139 Global Spread of Chemical and Biological Weapons Hearings, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S.
Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, May 1989;  testimony of Dr. David Huxsoll, pp. 199 to 203.
In questioning by the Senate committee staff, Dr. Huxsoll appeared, however, also to rely on the presence of
BL-4 facilities and “program intent” as two key discriminanda.  “Intent” is, of course, inferred by an outside
observer, and that key concept will be returned to below in a discussion on differentiating research programs.
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Senate, 101st Congress, 1st Session, May 1989; testimony of Dr. David Huxsoll, pp.199 to 203.  In
questioning by the Senate Committee staff, Dr. Huxsoll appeared, however, also to rely on the presence of
BL-4 facilities and “program intent” as two key discriminada.  “Intent” is , of course, inferred by an outside
observer, and that key concept will be returned to below in a discussion on differentiating research
programs.
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His argument was seconded by a U.S. Army Medical Intelligence officer who
similarly identified four key factors:  the amount of agent produced, the
attenuation of the organisms used for vaccine production, process difference
between vaccine and weapons production, and the openness of a defensive
program.141 
This analysis was carried further in a set of tables (see next three pages) prepared by the
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center in 1993 entitled “Signatures for Biological
Warfare Facilities.”142  It divided indicators into five categories:
      (1) Funding and personnel
      (2) Facility design, equipment, and security
      (3) Technical considerations
      (4) Safety
      (5) Process flow
Under each of these categories, it listed a series of common—or quite dissimilar—
characteristics in a “BW facility” and in a “legitimate facility” (e.g., the location of
refrigerated bunkers, facility security, the nature of waste treatment, location of air filters, air
pressure gradients, etc.)  Forty such characteristics were evaluated and appeared to provide
quite a good differentiation between the BW facility and the presumptive pharmaceutical or
other commercial site.
                                                
141 Ibid., Dr. Barry Erlick, pp. 33-40.
142 Signatures for Biological Warfare Facilities, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, 11 pages,
(unclassified).
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SIGNATURES FOR BIOLOGICAL WARFARE FACILITIES
 (Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center)
I.  FUNDING AND PERSONNEL
BW FACILITY LEGITIMATE FACILITY
1 Military funding Private enterprise or nonmilitary
2 High salary Salary within normal limits
3 Funding exceeds product/research output Average or underfunded for expected output
4 Scientists/technician ratio high Average ratio
5 Limited ethnic diversity Integrated work staff
6 Elite workforce/foreign trained Local trained workforce
7 Foreign language competency Limited foreign language capability
8 High ratio of military to civilian Military personnel unlikely
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II.  FACILITIES, SECURITY, AND EQUIPMENT
BW FACILITY LEGITIMATE FACILITY
1 Access control:  high walls, guard towers,
motion detectors, video cameras, elite
security force, badges and clearances
Average security, badges at most
2 Transportation provided Public/private transport
3 Quarantine facilities on compound No quarantine
4 Foreign travel restricted, highly available Unrestricted but not readily available
5 Refrigerated bunkers secure area Cold rooms in facility
6 Advanced software, external database
access ADP security high foreign access
Open information except for proprietary
information
7 Static aerosol test chambers No aerosol test chambers
8 Military with weapons expertise No need
9 Rail or heavy truck required for weapons
filling   facility
Only light truck transportation
III.  TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS
BW FACILITY LEGITIMATE FACILITY
1 Pathogenic or toxic strains Non-pathogenic or non-toxic strains
2 Test aimed at killing animals Test aimed at protecting animals
3 Facilities for large animals such as
monkeys
Facilities for smaller animals, specific inbred
strains
4 Negative air flow Positive air flow
5 No commercial products Commercial products
6 Weapons filing equipment Bottle filling equipment
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IV.  SAFETY
BW FACILITY LEGITIMATE FACILITY
1 Physical barriers to prevent animal-to-
animal and animal-to-human transmission
Physical barriers designed to prevent animal-to-
animal and human-to-animal transmission
2 HEPA filters present, exhaust HEPA filters possible, intake
3 Dedicated biosafety personnel May or may not be present
4 Infectious and toxic agent trained medical
staff
Dedicated highly trained staff not likely
5 Decontamination equipment and showers Not needed on large scale
6 Large capacity pass through autoclaves Small bench top autoclaves
7 Dedicated waste treatment Waste treatment common with local facilities
8 Special sterilization of waste May or may not exist
9 Test animals sterilized before final
disposal
Animals may not need to be sterilized before final
disposal
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V.  PROCESS FLOW
BW FACILITY LEGITIMATE FACILITY
1 Raw material consumption doesn’t equal
output
Raw material consumption relates to output
2 Large volume fermenters (greater than 500
 liters) cell cultures (1000s of culture
flasks/ rollerbottles) embryonated eggs
(100s thousands)
Large or small scale fermentation but cell  culture
and eggs in smaller volume
3 Air pressure gradients keep microbes in
vessel
Air pressure gradients keep contaminants out of
vessels
4 Finished product—wet stored at low
temperature in sealed (often double
packaging) containers—not readily
identifiable
Labelled by product, batch number, date,  etc.
5 Milling equipment operated in biohazard
protective suits
Milling equipment is not operated in biohazard
areas
6 Storage—low temperature, high security,
bunkers with biocontainment
Storage in temperature controlled environment,
clean warehouse conditions
7 Munitions—special filling buildings
and/or  explosives handling facilities
Non-issue
    
To address the problems of verification, one must examine and learn from the post-
World War II BW inspection regimes or trial inspection exercises.  There have been several,
and cumulatively, they do provide extremely useful information.
Under the terms of the Brussels Treaty and Paris agreements that established the
Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, a WEU Armaments Control Agency (ACA) was
established.  The terms of the Treaty were to remain in effect at least until the year 2005, and
under them the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) agreed never to manufacture chemical,
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biological, or nuclear weapons.  The ACA was to monitor the FRG’s compliance via non-
production controls.  It was to do that by examining “statistical and budgetary information,”
and by “test checks, visits and inspections at production plants, depots, and forces.”143  In
1959 a list of biological products (agents) to be controlled was approved. Although chemical
production sites were visited in subsequent years, formally biological ones were not, “. . . due
to the absence of any legal guarantees to protect private interests,” that is, the problem of
commercial secrecy.  However “technical information visits” were made to biological
facilities in the FRG and in other WEU countries.  In addition, an economic accounting
procedure was established.  A group of WEU military and biological experts met in 1959;
for each of the BW agents on the control list they established a “threshold” amount,
corresponding to the amount reckoned to be needed in order to obtain “direct military effect”
over an area of one square kilometer.  The WEU/ACA then asked the FRG to provide the
following information each year:
(1) The names of West German production plants144 capable of producing pathogenic
organisms or toxins.
(2) The biological products on the Agency’s list that were produced within the FRG during the previous
(3) The names of the plants which produced or processed these products.
(4) The names of plants which could have produced them but did not.
(5) The quantities produced by each plant, and the quantities consumed for civilian purposes.
(6) The quantities of civilian end-items made from these products during the previous
year, together with production estimates for the next year.
                                                
143 “The CB Weapons Controls of the Western European Union Armaments Control Agency,” Appendix 3 in
The Prevention of CBW, Vol. 5 in The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, SIPRI, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Almquist and Wiksell and Humanities Press, 1971.
144 The ACA defined “production plants” as “every unit suitable for producing in such amounts as are covered
by the definition of a biological weapon (i.e., the threshold amounts that were established for each BW agent)
those biological products which are to be controlled, regardless of its ownership, legal position, size and number
of workers employed.”  The thresholds, however, were established in an extremely inadequate manner.
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(7) The quantities of the products in stock at each plant.
The information was supplied by the FRG each year.
The first “east-west” BW trial inspection exercise was carried out in the mid-1960s by
the Pugwash BW study group.  It visited four laboratories in Stockholm, Vienna, Prague, and
Copenhagen.  This was greatly expanded upon in 1968-1969 in a trial inspection exercise
carried out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as part of its
major study on chemical and biological weapons arms control.145  Twenty-two laboratories
or production facilities were approached, of which 14 accepted site visits:  eight research
laboratories, three of them in Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) countries; and six
production establishments, none in the WTO, but one of them in Eastern Europe (the former
Yugoslavia).  The 22 facilities solicited were not, however, selected at random, but depended
on personal contacts known to the research team.  Twenty-five scientists from Western,
Eastern, and neutral states were involved in the teams that made the inspection visits.  A
reasonably elaborate protocol and questionnaire were developed for the site visits, whose
purpose was defined as locating sufficient BW agent production to be deemed to be
“militarily relevant.”  That was defined as 10 kilograms (around 20-25 pounds) of microbial
paste or spores, of a half kg (one pound) of botulinum toxin.  It should be noted that, at the
present time, an inspection team would be looking for orders of magnitude of larger
                                                
145 “The Problems of Inspection Concerned with BW Agents,” Chapter 2, in Technical Aspects of Early
Warning and Verification, Vol. 6 in The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare, SIPRI, Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute, Almquist and Wiksell and Humanities Press, 1975, pp. 39-60, 89-103.
See also Appendix 2, “Verification of CB Disarmament,” in Vol. 5, The Prevention of CBW, op. cit.,
1971, pp. 137-163. The institutions or laboratories that accepted visits in this exercise were the
following:
Research laboratories:
(1) The Medical Research Council Group for Bacteriological Bioengineering, Stockholm.
(2)  The Institute of Microbiology of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague.
(3)  The Institute of Virology for the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Bratislava.
(4)  Bundesforschungsanstalt fur Viruskrankheiten der Tiere, Tubingen, West Germany.
(5)  The Lister Institute of Preventative Medicine, London.
(6)  The State Institute of Hygiene, Warsaw.
(7)  The University Institute of Microbiology, Copenhagen.
(8)  The Institute of Hygiene, Graz, Austria.
Production establishments:
(9)  The Institute of Immunology, Zagreb, Yugoslavia.
(10) The Lister Institute of Preventative Medicine, Elstree Laboratories, Elstree, England.
(11) Wellcome Research Laboratories, Beckenham, Kent, England.
(12) Institut Merieux, Lyon, France.
(13) LEO Pharmaceutical Products, Copenhagen.
(14) Aktiebolaget ASTRA, Sodertalje, Sweden.
Miton Leitenberg / 81
quantities.  It is also understood that the 14 facilities that participated in the exercise did so
with the knowledge of their relevant national authorities. The visits, however, were not on
short warning.
Following all the visits, the protocol records were distributed to some 70 professionals
who were asked to judge what the chances would have been of finding the defined, militarily
relevant quantity.  Fifty replied, with a consensus that there would have been about a 50:50
chance of doing so.  The study concluded this:
“. . . that a substantial measure of on-site verification would be possible provided
certain conditions were fulfilled:  documentation, free access to all facilities and
personnel, the possibility of visits at short notice or of permanent inspection by
resident inspectors or by exchange scientists cooperating with them.”
A crucial assumption was that there was no falsification of production records at the
production sites—perhaps a weak link in the exercise. Otherwise, it is interesting to note the
similarity in the three basic conditions outlined in the conclusion and the ones that would be
assumed as necessary today.
In the 1990s two circumstances gave rise to a substantial group of BW inspections—
some as national exercises, and some on an international and official level:
! The U.S.-Russia-UK “Trilateral” process led to U.S.-UK inspection visits to Russian
facilities, and to Russian inspections of facilities in the United States and UK;
! And as part of the VEREX process, three Western governments—the UK, the 
Netherlands, and Canada—ran trial inspections of commercial facilities in their
respective countries.
There had, in fact, been Soviet visits to U.S. military BW sites in previous years.  Soviet
government officials at the ministerial level had visited Fort Detrick in 1972 at U.S.
government invitation, since the United States was interested in demonstrating the
conversion of the site.  Former Soviet officials again visited Fort Detrick—now
USAMRIID—in 1988.  U.S. and Soviet delegations also visited each other’s BW facilities
in 1991, before the trilateral series of exchange site visits began.  In addition, representatives
of Western pharmaceutical firms—from the United States, UK, Austria, France, and Finland,
as well as from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea—have been visiting Russian
microbiological research institutes that were formerly affiliated with the Soviet Biopreparat
organization to explore the feasibility of establishing joint venture commercial partnerships.
 When Russian teams have visited U.S. facilities, they have shown themselves to be highly
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meticulous inspectors:  they have known what to look for, what might be hidden, and how
it would be hidden, and at times they have clearly used their own former BW program as a
model for searches.146
In the course of the VEREX process, the Netherlands and Canada carried out a two-day
trial inspection at a large vaccine production facility.  Its purpose was to evaluate potential
BW verification measures that had been identified by VEREX.  It concluded that “the
combining of measures would be essential to effective on-site inspection.  During the trial
inspection, issues relating to commercial confidentiality did not stand in the way of effective
conduct of the inspection.  Some sensitivities were noted, but solutions were at hand.”147  In
particular, “Removal of live samples from the site would have been of great concern to the
company, but removal of inactivated samples was not perceived to be a problem.”
In conjunction with VEREX, the UK carried out four practice inspections of plants in
the biotechnology, pharmaceutical, and vaccine industries.  The UK inspections were
particularly focused on issues of the compatibility of verification procedures in large
multipurpose facilities capable of working with pathogens and the requirements of
commercial confidentiality.  The UK reports concluded this:
 “In-depth inspections are practicable:  auditing, interviews and visual inspection
of key equipment are all essential and mutually reinforcing.  Any measure on its
own is of little or no value.
 “Provided the sites being inspected make preparations and use managed access,
the risks to commercially sensitive information can be reduced.  On many
occasions the amount of access that can be granted without unduly risking
proprietary data can be extensive.
“The standards of evidence for an effective inspection are high.  This is a qualitative
problem as unambiguous evidence of non-compliance is difficult to acquire, but
indicators of such activity can be identified.  Given the potential dual-use nature of
biological agents and much related equipment, inspection teams need evidence from
all aspects of the site under investigation if they are to form a judgment on its
compliance.  The main burden on industry is largely one of diversion of management
time to hosting the inspection;  there should be no need to disrupt plant operations or
enter sterile area provided alternative means can be found to satisfy inspector
                                                
146 A Soviet team on a December 1991 U.S. site visit was composed of members of the Soviet Ministry of
Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their biotechnology industry.
147 The Netherlands-Canada;  Bilateral Trial Inspection in a Large Vaccine Production Facility;  A Contribution
to the Evaluation of Potential Verification Measures, BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP. 112, May 24, 1993, 19
pages.
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concerns.”
* * * *
“The IT [inspection team] was able to gather sufficient information to do its job
effectively without compromising commercial confidentiality or Intellectual
Property rights.  It was possible for the HT [Facility or “Home” Team] to protect
such information:  for example, the deletion of critical data from the facility’s
Genetic Manipulation Safety Committee submissions to the national regulatory
body before revealing the documents to the inspection team.  There may however
be different problems in a production plant and this will be addressed in future
practice inspections, but it is encouraging to note that it is possible to conduct an
intrusive inspection at an R&D and pilot plant facility without unacceptable
compromise of commercial confidentiality.  That an inspection can be carried out
at an R&D plant is in itself highly significant.
 “This practice inspection demonstrated the feasibility of on-site inspections. 
Furthermore, it is clear that they are worthwhile and can be conducted in Western
countries without too much disruption to activities.  Given the nature of health,
safety, environmental, and other regulatory provisions that govern the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries in the West, demonstrating
compliance with Article 1 of the BWC is comparatively straightforward.”148
Finally, the Federation of American Scientists carried out an inspection exercise in the
United States with the cooperation of a commercial pharmaceutical plant.149 
Undoubtedly of great value to any international BW inspection agency or regime would
be the verification protocols established by UNSCOM for its site visits to biological
facilities in Iraq.  These, and the experience gained from them, as well as from the series
of trilateral site visits, would all undoubtedly be transferred to any new international BW
agency.150 The British, Canadian, Dutch, and U.S. inspection exercises were all
                                                
148 United Kingdom BTWC Practice Compliance Inspection (PCI) Programme, Summary Report,
BWC/SP/CONF/WP. 2, September 20, 1994;  UK Practice Inspection:  Pharmaceutical Pilot Plant,
BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP 141, May 24, 1993;  UK Practice Inspection:  Pharmaceutical Pilot Plant,
BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/WP 147, (undated);  Commercial Confidentiality Concerns Associated with Sampling
and Analysis During On-Site Inspections Under the BWC, BWC/CONF. III/VEREX/NON. 28, (undated).
149 Beyond VEREX:  A Legally Binding Compliance Regime for the Biological Weapons Convention, Report
of the Federation of American Scientists Working Group on Biological and Toxin Weapons Verification, July
1994. See also, “ Implementation of the Proposals for a Verification Protocol to the Biological Weapons
Convention,” (FAS), September 1991, op. cit., for the protocol of off-site and on-site data which the group
proposed.
150 For other major sources on BW verification, see the following:  Barbara Hatch Rosenberg and Gordon
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informally criticized by representatives of the U.S. Biotechnology Industry Organization
as having been too “tame” and captive, and not as severe as they would have had to face
from international inspectors.  They submitted a study to the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency before the July 1995 meeting of the Ad Hoc Group, essentially
arguing that they wanted no on-site inspections of their facilities. Difficulties therefore
remain in reconciling the thoroughness of on-site inspections and the concerns of
pharmaceutical manufacturers to safeguard commercial proprietary information.  It
remains to be seen how difficult it will be to reconcile the two goals.  A resolution may be
arrived at indirectly, through the criteria that an inspection directorate would use to select
and authorize on-site inspections.
One important question remains: Can one distinguish microbiological research that is
being carried out for “civil” purposes from that which is for military purposes?  In research
carried out some years ago, this author became confident that if one could not unequivocally
answer “yes,” there were reasonably good indicators which could be gathered from scientific
work to help make the distinction.151  However, that task was made immeasurably more
difficult once U.S. BW R&D managers made the argument that in order to anticipate the
nature of future BW threats that U.S. military forces might encounter, they had to produce
novel surface antigens on pathogens, test organisms with increased virulence, or any of the
many other parameters that an offensive BW program might develop against U.S. vaccines
and defenses.  This problem was described in a paper by Barbara Hatch Rosenberg in 1988,
                                                                                                                                                
Burck, “Verification of Compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention,” Chapter 14 in Susan Wright,
(ed.), Preventing a Biological Arms Race, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990, pp. 300-329;  Oliver Thranert, (ed.),
The Verification of the Biological Weapons Convention:  Problems and Perspectives, Fri edrich Ebert Stiftung,
Bonn, May 1992;  Susan Berger, “The Challenges of Chemical and Biological Weapons Arms Control Treaty
Verification,” in Elizabeth Kirk, et. al. (eds.), Trends and Implications for Arms Control, Proliferation, and
International Security in the Changing Global Environment, AAAS, American Association for the
Advancement of Science, Washington, D.C., 1993, pp. 175-189; Amb. Tibor Toth, et. al., “Verification of the
BWC,” and Nicholas A. Sims, “Control and Cooperation in Biological Defense Research:  National
Programmes and International Accountability,” Chapters 6 and 7 in E. Geissler and J.P. Woodall (eds.), The
Control of Dual-Threat Agents:  The Vaccines for Peace Programme, SIPRI, The Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, pp. 77-105;  M. Meselson, et. al.,
“Verification of Biological and Toxin Weapons Disarmament,” in Verification, Monitoring Disarmament, F.
Caloger, et. al., (eds.), Westview Press, Boulder, 1990, pp. 149-163.
151 I have attempted to resolve this question on two earlier occasions:  in a study “Research and Development
in (C)BW;  An Examination of the Possibility of Distinguishing Between Civil and Military, Offensive and
Defensive,” that was written in 1970 as part of the SIPRI CBW project and presented at the International
Congress of Microbiology in Mexico City in 1970, and then in an expanded version for a book manuscript on
Military Research and Development for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, in 1983-1984.
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“Military insistence upon testing detection and protective devices against bona fide
weapons agents means that information on offensive use of weapons agents will
inevitably be obtained.
 “According to the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD):  ‘Current requirements in
biological defense include testing equipment against known and suspected threat
agents. . . . We especially need more information about protection against novel
agents.’  Because these agents do not exist, they will have to be created in order to
study the threat they could pose.  Threat evaluation also requires detailed
information on ‘new production and processing technologies as they apply to
conventional and novel biological agents.’“The military is also interested in
protective vaccines, which are useful not only as defense against an enemy attack,
but are also required to protect aggressors.  Such vaccines cannot be developed
without possessing the agents themselves.  Thus, defense without the potential for
offense is essentially impossible, and all these ‘defensive’ activities are actually
inconsistent with the convention’s aim to exclude the possible use of biological and
toxin agents as weapons.”152
The same counterproductive effects of maximizing the requirements of “defensive” research
were pointed out by several other microbiologists writing on BW arms control, and they are
a major theme of the book edited by Susan Wright in 1990, Preventing a Biological Arms
Race.153  Once one takes this position as a requirement for defensive research (omitting the
issue of protective vaccines being required for the attacker), there is virtually nothing that
cannot be done in a defensive research program.  Everything then hinges on quantities,
weapons development, and “intent.”
                                                
152 Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, “International Biological Weapons Update,” Genewatch, July-October 1987, pp.
6-7, 15.  (The DoD references are to U.S. Department of Defense testimony to the House Committee on
Appropriations, May 1986.)
153 Susan Wright (ed.), Preventing a Biological Arms Race, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1990.  See in particular
the following chapters:  Susan Wright and Stuart Ketcham, “The Problem of Interpreting the U.S. Biological
Defense Program,” pp. 169-196;  Charles Piller and Keith R. Yamamoto, “The U.S. Biological Defense
Research Program in the 1980s:  A Critique,” pp. 133-168;  Jonathan King and Harlee Strauss, “The Hazards
of Defensive Biological Warfare Programs,” pp. 120-132;  Richard Novick and Seth Shulman, “New Forms
of Biological Warfare?”, pp. 103-119;  “Recombinant DNA Projects Funded by U.S. Military Agencies,”
Appendix L, pp. 413-420.  Also, pp. 80-84, 87-97, 335-337, 340-351. See also,  Jonathan King and Harlee
Strauss, “The Fallacy of Defensive Biological Weapons Programmes,” in Biological and Toxin Weapons
Today, Erhard Geissler (ed.), SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Oxford University
Press, 1986, pp. 66-81;  Susan Wright, “Biowar Treaty in Danger,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 47:7,
September 1991, pp. 36-40. 
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An excellent example of this was demonstrated by the U.S. Army request in 1984 to
build a large aerosol test chamber at the Dugway Proving Ground “. . . to generate amounts
of infectious agents that could potentially be used as biological weapons.  The chief purpose
of the facility would be to test whether the agents penetrate protective clothing and filters.”154
 After several years of debate, the Army cancelled its request in 1988 due to opposition
precisely on the grounds that the facility would blur the distinction between defensive and
offensive research.  The U.S. government had inactivated precisely such a large aerosol test
chamber when it dismantled the offensive BW R&D program at Fort Detrick in the years
1969 to 1972.  Even more to the point,  when U.S. inspectors found precisely the same kind
of aerosol test chamber at the former Soviet Biopreparat facility at Obolensk in 1992-1993,
 the presence of the test chamber was given as evidence of the offensive nature of the former
Soviet BW program. The same was true of the Iraqi BW program when UNSCOM inspectors
found that another aerosol test chamber had  been a part of the Iraqi facility at Al-Hakam, but
had been destroyed by Iraq before the inspectors got there.
When Soviet BW inspectors visited USAMRIID in 1991, officials there felt
confident that precisely because of the expertise of the Soviet team they would understand
how far the USAMRIID program was from one that intended weapons development. 
Nevertheless, the visitors found portions of the U.S. research program troubling;  in this case,
what looked like an entirely open program to U.S. research managers still posed problems
for an outsider.  One such aspect was USAMRIID research on toxins, precisely a portion of
the former Soviet basic research program that was frequently raised as a problematical issue
in the 1980s.  It is problems such as these dealing with “intent” that suggest that looking for
production and weaponry might be more useful for an international BW inspection regime
than examining research.  And it is here, too, that formal aspects—such as secrecy, the
occurrence of covert BW programs run by military or intelligence agencies, and the role of
military agencies in funding and operating BW research programs and institutions—are
shown to be highly important considerations.
Nevertheless, researchers have been able to prepare lists of indicators which quite
usefully separate “civilian” from “military,” and “offensive” from “defensive”
microbiological research.  As early as 1963, Morton prepared such a categorization which
distinguished various aerobiological techniques according to their utility for “medicine,”
                                                
154 Colin Norman, “Army Shifts on Dugway Lab,” Science, 241:4874, September 30, 1988, p. 1749;  Colin
Norman, “Biological Defense Defended,” Science, 240:4855, May 20, 1988, p. 981;  R. Jeffrey Smith, “Under
Pressure, Army Scales Back Plan for Germ Warfare Lab,” Washington Post, September 20, 1988.
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“defense,” and “theory.”155  More recently, several additional lists were included in the 1990
volume edited by Wright.156 
                                                
155 J.D. Morton, table on “Relationship of Aerobiological Techniques to Useful Situations,” in “Remarks from
the Chair:  A Critique,” First International Symposium in Aerobiology, Berkeley, 1963, p. 186.
156 Tables that differentiate BW R&D into military and civil, offensive, and defensive programs:  M. Lappe,
“Criteria for judging the likelihood of misuse of potential biological warfare research,” in Susan Wright, (ed.),
Preventing a Biological Arms Race, p. 88;  Susan Wright and Stuart Ketcham, “Pathogens studied under DoD
sponsorship as potential biological warfare agents compared with pathogens identified by the Institute of
Medicine as the leading cause of disease in developing countries,” in Susan Wright, (ed.), 1990, pp. 178-179;
 C. Piller and K.R. Yamamoto, “U.S. BW program development—offensive development implications,” (during
the 1980s) in Susan Wright, (ed.), 1990, p. 143;  Susan Wright and Stuart Ketcham, “Present activities
conducted under the Biological Defense Program and related activities conducted under the Chemical Warfare
Program,” in Susan Wright, (ed.), 1990, p. 189. See also, Barend ter Haar, The Future of Biological Weapons,
The Washington Papers, No. 151, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington and Praeger, New
York, 1991, particularly pp. 54-75, and the table “Activities permitted or prohibited in the Biological Weapons
Convention,” p. 63; USAMRIID;  United States Army Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1995;  FOA
4;  In the Service of the Swedish Total Defense and of the Entire Community, 1986.
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Concluding Remarks
Unfortunately, biological weapons were not laid to rest in the years since 1972.  Several
nations have gone on to develop the capability to produce BW at short notice and have done
so precisely in the years since the Biological Weapons Convention came into force in 1975.
The former USSR’s—and presently Russia’s—continuing delinquency in putting a
certain and definitive end to its own BW program has been a severe impediment to
international efforts to stop and to reverse any further trends toward BW proliferation.  First,
 Russia inherited one of the two major post-World War II offensive BW programs—and one
which the former USSR had continued despite signing and ratifying the BWC—that
established an extremely damaging precedent. Moreover, the continued resistance to making
a determined show of reparations by doing away with the remainders of the program once
and for all only add further damage to the BWC.  It is important that Russia remove whatever
secrecy remains surrounding its BW establishments, both military and civilian.  Second,
Russia’s delinquency weakens the combined efforts of the major powers in applying pressure
on those nations that have more recently developed BW programs to begin reversing and
expunging them.
Nations that have developed BW programs in recent years, such as Iran and Libya, are
not particularly open to persuasion.  The major institutional indicators—secrecy and the role
of military or intelligence agencies in funding and managing BW programs—are constant
indicators of problems, and most certainly when all three occur together.  Much more thought
should be given to the pressure of sanctions by the international community.  Following the
additional example of Iraq, a state that had gone on to develop BW despite having signed
(although not ratified) the BWC, much more thought needs to be given particularly to the
circumstances in which a State Party to the BWC shows evidence of developing and
producing biological weapons, and the sanctions that should be applied in such instances.
 The suggestion has also been made that there should be prior international agreement to
automatically impose severe sanctions on any nation identified as having used biological
weapons.157  It has been pointed out that the lack of any serious international response to
Iraq’s use of chemical weapons in 1984 against Iran was the stimulus for Iran’s development
and production of chemical weapons, as well as for its biological weapons program.
                                                
157 Mark L. Wheelis, “Strengthening Biological Weapons Control Through Global Epidemiological
Surveillance,” Politics and the Life Sciences, 11:2, August 1992, pp. 179-189.
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It had been hoped  that 1996 would see the proposal of an international verification
regime as a protocol to the BWC.  It would require an international monitoring organization,
probably similar to that which has been established under the Chemical Weapons
Convention.  It was considered likely that such a regime would provide for the opportunity
for both routine and challenge on-site inspections to facilities or locations in member states.
  That will now be delayed further.
Domestically, the U.S. government runs the risk of having impeded its current efforts
to defeat the spread of biological weapons of mass destruction by exaggerated concerns
several years ago regarding corporate commercial secrecy.  Trial inspections carried out by
several Western nations in recent years as a contribution toward producing a strengthened
verification regime for the BWC showed that this was a manageable concern.  It will be
important for the U.S. government to maintain its focus on stemming BW proliferation as
its first and overwhelming priority.  Other considerations that relate to that effort can be
adapted to aid in that endeavor.
In that regard, Senate ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention would be a
crucially important step, establishing the U.S. interest in a serious verification regime in the
chemical and biological areas.  Getting the CWC out of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to the floor of the Senate for a vote took two years. This required ending the
ability of a single U.S. senator to prevent a major arms control treaty on one of the three
categories of weapons of mass destruction—a treaty that the Bush administration had
championed, that the United States signed, and that took over 20 years of international
negotiation to achieve—from being sent to the U.S. Senate for ratification.  It now appears
that opposition by an almost equally small number of countries in the international arena will
delay the achievement of a verification regime for the BWC for an additional two or more
years.
Author’s Note:
A second edition published in December 1997 afforded the opportunity to add three brief
comments regarding important events in 1997 pertaining to Biological Weapons Arms
Control.
1.   In regard to the final paragraph above, the Chemical Weapons Convention was
approved by the US Senate on April 24, 1997. However, this success required
extraordinary exertions by the administration, and the outcome was in doubt until the
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final day or two prior to the Senate vote. Given that experience, should a  verification
protocol to the BWTC reach the  Senate with a continuing Republican majority, it is
likely that its passage would be severely contested.
2.   In 1997 the Ad-Hoc Group of nations that are parties to the BWTC turned to
preparing a rolling text for the verification protocol. It is hoped that this might be
completed in 1998.  However, with continuous impediments being placed in its way by
Iran, and increasingly also by Russia, it is impossible to say if this process will succeed. 
It is not likely that on-site inspection provisions will be at all comparable to those in the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
3.   Iraq continued in material breach of its obligations under United Nations Security
Council Resolutions, and increasingly impeded and interfered with UNSCOM operations
in the spring, summer, and fall of 1997.  By November 1997 Iraq had forgone
approximately $130 billion in oil export earnings since 1991 in order to retain portions of
its biological, chemical and ballistic missile programs. After Security Council debates in
June and October 1997, Iraq demanded the alteration of UNSCOM procedures, which led
to a crisis in November 1997. However, France, Russia, and China refused to agree to
Security Council measures to increase pressure on Iraq to comply. In those circumstances
Iraq is able to maintain its violation, and to maintain portions of its weapons of mass
destruction programs, most particularly its BW programs. Affairs deteriorated to the point
that the integrity and credibility of the UN Security Council and its measures were at
stake.
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